Brooklyn Law School

BrooklynWorks
Faculty Scholarship

5-2019

One Dollar, One Vote: Mark-to-Market
Governance in Bankruptcy
Edward J. Janger
Brooklyn Law School, edward.janger@yale.edu

Adam J. Levitan

Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/faculty
Part of the Bankruptcy Law Commons
Recommended Citation
104 Iowa L. Rev. 1857 (2018-2019)

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized
administrator of BrooklynWorks.

One Dollar, One Vote:
Mark-to-Market Governance in
Bankruptcy
EdwardjJange? & Adamj Levitin**
ABSTRACT: In bankruptcy, creditorsexercise governance rights over a debtor
firm-they vote to accept or reject a proposed plan of reorganization. These
governance rights are apportionedbased on the amount of a creditor'sclaim:
"one dollar, one vote." This allocation assumes a claim reflects the creditor's
true economic interest in the debtor, and the creditor is thus presumed to use
its governance rights in the bankruptcy to maximize the value of the debtor,
and hence its claim.
Yet a creditor'sfinancial interest is not always limited or even linked to the
face amount of its claim. Forexample, the interest ofemployee creditorsextends
beyond recoveringback pay to ensuringfuture employment, while a landlord's
interest may be less in recoveringback rent than in being able to terminate a
lease so it can relet the property at a higherrate. Historically, this has been a
discrete and manageable problem. Two recent developments in financial
markets, however, have made the mismatch between a creditor'stotaleconomic
interests and its claim-and the concomitant governance rights-more
problematic.
First, a robust market has arisen in distressed debt, enabling investors to
purchase bankruptcy claims-and thus governance rights-ata discount.
Second, the emergence of derivatives markets now enables investors to go
"short" on the debtor and benefit from its misfortune. Combined, these
developments enable investors to cheaply acquire governance rights in
bankruptcy and then use that power to further the value of their extraneous
*
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interests rather than maximizing the value of their bankruptcy claim. As a
result, the "one dollar, one vote" principle underlyingbankruptcy governance
is now in question.
This Article illustrates problems that resultfrom the divergence of economic
interests and governance rights in bankruptcy. It shows that existing
bankruptcy law tools, such as disclosure, vote designation, trading bars,
equitablesubordination, and equitabledisallowance, fail to provide adequate
remediesfor the problems. Accordingly, we propose an administrablesystem of
"mark-to-market governance," in which the governance rights, but not the
economic distribution rights, associated with a creditor's bankruptcy claim
would be adjusted to rejlect the creditor's true net economic position. Under
mark-to-market governance, hedgers and shorts would be subject to
proportionaldilution, claims purchaserswould have their governance rights
discounted based on purchase price, and secured creditors would have their
credit bidding rights limited to the value of their collateral. Together these
adjustments will promote the core bankruptcy policies of maximizing the value
of the debtorfirm and equitably distributingits value.
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INTRODUCTION

Bankruptcy is a system for maximizing, realizing, and fairly distributing
the value of a failed firm to its stakeholders. In Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy
Code an independent and disinterested trustee liquidates the debtor firm.,
Secured creditors are paid from the proceeds of their collateral, and any

1.

1i U.S.C. § 704

(2012).

IOWA LAWREVIEW

i 860

EVOI. 104:1857

remaining realized value is distributed among unsecured creditors and equity
holders according to a prescribed statutory waterfall.2 Because the Chapter 7
liquidation system is nondiscretionary, it establishes a distributional baseline
and raises relatively few governance questions.
In contrast, Chapter 11 provides a mechanism for restructuring a firm as
a going concern.3 Governance questions abound because the firm needs to
continue operating while in bankruptcy, while simultaneously formulating a
plan for its post-bankruptcy operations and determining how to compensate
the various stakeholders. How can the value of the firm be maximized? How
should it be allocated? How should asset-based priority be determined when
the assets are not being sold? If the firm is not liquidated, how does the
Bankruptcy Code allocate any asset value or going-concern value created or
preserved by the bankruptcy process?4
To address these strategic and distributional questions, Chapter 11
implements a governance regime that allows pre-bankruptcy managers to
remain in control as debtors-in-possession ("DIP"), but gives creditors and
other interested parties greater voice in any decisions outside "the ordinary
course of business."5 During the case, creditors may challenge the DIP's
6
actions as inconsistent with "business judgment." But, most importantly, at
the end of the case, creditors (and equity holders) have a vote on whether to
accept or reject a plan.7 In theory this vote allows stakeholders to express their
preferences on how best to maximize firm value and to negotiate as to how
that value should be allocated. The Chapter i i negotiation takes place against
the backdrop of certain statutory minima-the hypothetical liquidation value
creditors would receive in Chapter 7 and the "fair and equitable" (also known
as "cramdown") standard.'
A fundamental assumption of Chapter il's distributional and
governance schemes are that a stakeholder's economic interest in the debtor
is reflected in the face amount of its claim, and that it will act accordingly.
2.

Id.

§§

725-726.

Seeid.§§122-1129.
3.
It can improve
Chapter ii improves on compulsory state process in a variety of ways.
4.
of
recovery on assets by facilitating a value-maximizing sale, and it can preserve the value
detailed
more
a
For
remade.
is
structure
capital
its
as
alive
business
the
keeping
operations by
be
discussion of entitlements to this "Bankruptcy-Code-created value" and how it should
Priceof Process in
the
Allocating
Bonds:
Cube
Ice
Janger,
J.
Edward
&
Jacoby
B.
Melissa
see
allocated,
& Edward
Chapter ii Bankruptcy, 123 YALE L.J. 862, 892-95,916-26 (2014); and Melissa B.Jacoby
682-87
673,
L.
REV.
TEX.
96
i
i,
Chapter
in
Value
Allocating
and
Realizing
Equity:
Tracing
J.Janger,
(2018) [hereinafterJacoby &Janger, TracingEquity].
5.
6.

1

U.S.C.

§ 363(c).

See, e.g., In re Curlew Valley Assocs., 14 BR. 5o6, 507-08 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981) (raising

objection to debtor's decision to bale hay instead of cubing it).
creditors have
7. 1i U.S.C. §§ 1126, 129(a)(8), 1g29(a)(io). In bankruptcy jargon,
refer
"claims" against the debtor and equity holders have "interests" in the debtor. We generally
stakeholders.
financial
all
for
phrase
catchall
a
as
to creditors in this Article

8.

Id.

§§

x29(a) (7), 1129(b).
1
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Distribution of value to an individual unsecured creditor is allocated pro-rata,
in proportion to the total amount of debt in the class.9 This same pro-rata
principle is implemented for governance rights through the principle of "one
dollar, one vote."1o While Chapter 1 1 contains a variety of other statutory
protections for creditors and other financial stakeholders,I many are aimed
at preserving the integrity of the vote, which is arguably the creditors' most
important protection.2
The "one dollar, one vote" principle is simple, and can be viewed as a
corollary to the principle of equal (or pan passu) treatment.'s Where a class
of creditors' rights are unimpaired, they have no standing to object to plan
confirmation and no right to vote. 4 But if a class is not being made whole,
the distributional burden should be shared proportionally-and so should
decision-making power. If a creditor is owed $20 million, and the plan of
reorganization proposes paying lo% of the face amount of the claims, that
creditor will receive $2 million as a distribution. If there are a total of $80
million in unsecured claims outstanding, that creditor's distribution will
represent one-quarter of the assets distributed. That same creditor will also
control one-quarter of the votes that decide whether that class will accept the
proposed plan.
The assumption that underlies giving creditors governance rights is that
the interests of the creditor and the firm are aligned-that the creditor's
motivating economic interest is maximizing its recovery on that $20 million
claim. The Code assumes that creditors are "long" and favor a larger recovery
for the creditor's class, or at least that they are not "short," meaning that the
creditor would, because of extraneous interests, prefer a smaller recovery
from the debtor or the liquidation of the debtor firm.
The alignment between claim and economic interest has never been
perfect: creditors with similar legal rights may see things differently. For
example, suppliers and bondholders may take different views of how to
9.

Id.

§§726(b), 1123(a)(4), 1129(a)(7).

10.
See id. § 1126(c). To be more specific, the Code requires two majorities: one-half
in
number and two-thirds in amount. Id. In one case it is one claim, one vote. In the other it is one
dollar, one vote. As a practical matter, it is usually the two-thirds figure that comes into play.
11.
See, e.g., id. §§ 1122, 1123(a)(4), 1 125, 1129(a)(1)-(3), 1129(a)(7), 1129(a)(9),
1129(a)(1i),

1129(b).

Indeed, the Supreme Court recently affirmed the importance of

maintaining the integrity of the plan process. Czyzewski v. Jevic
Holding Corp., 137 S. Ct. 973,
986 (2017) ("[T]he distributions at issue here more closely resemble proposed transactions that
lower courts have refused to allow on the ground that they circumvent the Code's procedural
safeguards.").
12.
See infra text accompanying note 216. Section i 125 assures adequate disclosure, and
§ 1126 deals specifically with the voting process. See i1 U.S.C. §§ 1 125-1126.
13. The pai passu principle is often attributed to Lord Mansfield, who famously said, "The
policy of the bankrupt law introduced by 21 Jac. 1, c. 19, and followed ever since, is to level
all
creditors, who have not actually recovered satisfaction, or got hold of a pledge which
the
bankrupt could not defeat." Worseley v. De Mattos (1758) 97 Eng. Rep. 407, 416 (KB).
14.
11 U.S.C.§§ 1124, 1126(f), 1129(a)(7), 1129(a)(8), 112 9 (b)(1).
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maximize value: one hoping for future business from the debtor; the other
Unlike
hoping to maximize the immediate return on their bonds.
bondholders, suppliers may be willing to take greater losses on existing debts
in order to ensure the survival of a customer. Furthermore, creditors have
in
long been able to separate their economic interest from their voting power
holding
by
or
competitors
debtor's
the
in
other ways: through investments
multiple interests across the capital structure.
As a result of these issues, there have always been some basic procedures
in place to remedy conflicts of interest and to punish bad behavior.5 These
include separate classification, vote designation, and equitable subordination.
The advent of modern financial derivatives and the increased liquidity of
distressed debt markets present a serious challenge to the existing safeguards
in three ways: (1) by making it easier for creditors to take economic positions
that run counter to the stated face amount of their claims; (2) by making it
easier to accumulate control, and/or blocking positions at a discount; and
(3) by making these facts considerably less transparent.
First, modern derivative instruments, such as options and credit default
that link
swaps, enable investors with significant claims to construct positions
or even
significant voting power to economic positions that are indifferent
6
economically "short."' These investors are often called "empty creditors," in
that their voting rights are not tied to their economic interest.'7 Indeed, when
such empty creditors are economically "short," they may actually profit from
the firm's further misfortune, and, because of their voting rights, may have
the power to bring such misfortune about.
For example, a creditor can transfer the economic risk-the
distributional rights-on a bankruptcy claim to a third-party through the
fixed
purchase of a (transferrable) swap that guaranties the purchaser a
return. The value of this swap to the purchaser/creditor increases as the value
of the creditor's distributional rights in the bankruptcy decline. Thus, the risk
of what the debtor will pay out on a $i million bankruptcy claim can be offset
by a swap for $i million (minus the cost of the swap). The swap will pay the
purchaser the difference or "spread" between the face amount of the claim
value
($i million), and the actual distribution. The "spread" increases as the
bankruptcy
the
if
of the bankruptcy distribution falls. For example,
distribution on the $1

million claim is $400,000, then the swap will pay

$6oo,ooo, while if the bankruptcy distribution is only $200,000, then the swap
will pay $8oo,ooo. The decrease in the value of the distributional rights from
the claim will be offset by the increase in value of the swap: a $i million swap
operates as a hedge against the credit risk associated with $i million claim.
See infra Sections IV.A-.D.
the Bankruptcy
See, e.g., Samuel M. Kidder, Comment, What's Your Position?Amending
(201 1).
Disclosure Rules to Keep Pace with FinancialInnovation, 58 UCLA L. REV. 803, 807
An Overview, M&A
I 7. See, e.g., Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, Debt and Hybrid Decoupling:
LAw., Apr. 2008, at 1, 515.

i6.
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Unlike insurance, however, a swap need not be tied to an "insurable
interest." A swap can be used to make a bet, unlinked to any economic interest
in the debtor whatsoever. The swap purchaser need not be a creditor. A socalled "naked" credit default swap that is unmatched to an actual economic
interest is an economically "short" bet on creditworthiness of the firm.
Naked shorts are not inherently problematic. A "short" that is unlinked
to an actual economic interest in the firm does not directly affect the firm
-though it may have an indirect effect.' 8 More importantly, a short that is
unlinked to any power to influence the firm does not affect the firm's
decision-making processes. When, however, an economically short interest is
linked to the power to influence the firm, mischief may ensue.'1 For example,
if a creditor has a claim against the debtor sufficient to block the confirmation
of a plan of reorganization, and the creditor purchases swap protection in an
amount greater than the face amount of the claim, then the combined
positions leave the investor net "short." Thus, the risk associated with the
payout on a $i million claim (which will almost never be more than $i
million, unless, for some reason, the claim was purchased above par) can be
more than offset by a swap based on a $3 million fixed payment. The result is
that the claimant will have an incentive to exercise its control rights to harm
the debtor in order to maximize its return on the swap.
The second challenge is a product of the liquidity of distressed debt in
modern commercial markets. Modern claims trading now makes it easier for
incumbent creditors and even third parties to purchase debt in order to
accumulate a control position. Accounts receivable have always been freely
assignable.2o Contractual debt can be embodied in negotiable instruments,
which are both freely assignable,2' and transferred in physical form as

i8. Short derivative positions can indirectly impact firms. The nature of credit default swaps
is that for one party to go short, it needs to be paired with another investor that wants to go long.
This means that there are two ways of going long on a firm, directly and derivatively, so there will
be opportunities to arbitrage between the two types of long positions. Accordingly, the greater
the short demand there is in the swap market, the greater the price that one can get for taking
the long position in a swap. That in turn exerts a downward effect on the market price of the
direct long position. In and of itself, this has no effect other than to create short pressure on
a
firm, but in certain circumstances, it can affect firm behavior. Thus, during the housing bubble
in the United States in the 2000s, short demand for swaps had the ironic effect of temporarily
pumping up housing prices. See generally Adam J. Levitin & Susan M. Wachter, Explaining the
Housing Bubble, too GEO. L.J. I 177 (2012) (explaining the impact that short derivative positions
have on firms). In order for mortgage lenders to compete for the business of longs with the swaps
market, they had to offer ever higher yields, which mean making ever riskier mortgages, which
had the short-term effect of expanding housing credit and boosting housing prices. See id. at
1244-4919.
See infra text accompanying notes 67-69 for an egregious example.
20.
See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. § 13-101 (Mckinney 2019) (stating actions unrelated to personal
injury are freely assignable); U.C.C. § 9-406(d), (f) (AM. LAwINST. & UNIF. ILAw
COMM'N 2000).
21.
U.C.C. § 3-104(a) (i) (AM. LAw INST. & UNIF. LAw COMM'N 2002).
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Indeed, legal doctrines such as "holder in due course"23 and

federal programs that guarantee residential mortgages or bank deposits are
24
designed to enhance the value of debt transferred as property. Lending and
information technology, have, however, both greased the wheels.
Sophisticated swaps and derivatives, coupled with mechanisms for
transferring claims quickly and cheaply have changed the landscape. 25
Bankruptcy is no different. Debt and equity continue to trade freely even
after the debtor has filed for bankruptcy. The automatic stay that enjoins most
collection efforts against the debtor does not interfere with a creditor's right
6
under non-bankruptcy law to assign its claim.2 Bankruptcy law requires only
registration of the transfer of a claim; the court does not police such transfers
or record the price.27 The ability to buy and sell bankruptcy claims means that
investors can simply buy claims and acquire both distributional rights and
governance rights. Derivatives, in turn, make the economic interest associated
with such positions less transparent because a party's derivative holdings, and
hence net economic interest, are not generally publicly observable.

22.

Id. §3-201.

§§3-302, 3-305-3-306.
EdwardJ. Janger, The Costs of Liquidity Enhancement: TransparencyCost, Risk Alteration, and
J. Levitin & Susan
CoordinationProblems, 4 BROOK.J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 39, 46 (2oog); Adam
23.

Id.

24.

1 (201 3).
M. Wachter, The Public Option in Housing Finance, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. i I 1 1, 1 14
(2014) (providing
REVOLT
STREET
WALL
A
Boys:
FLASH
LEWIS,
See generally MICHAEL
25.

extreme examples of swaps impacting the economic landscape).
11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2012).
26.
of the
FED. R. BANKR. P. 3oo. The rule does not even require timely registration
27.
transfer. See id.
While the 1983 comment to Rule 3001 (e) reflected a concern with claims trading, the
transfers of
1991 amendments were expressly intended to limit the role of the court in policing
original
The
Id.
required.
was
paid
consideration
the
of
statement
no
claims, making it clear that
comment to Rule

3

oo 1(e)

states:

Subdivision (e). . . .The interests of sound administration are served by requiring the
post-petition transferee to file with the proof of claim a statement of the transferor
acknowledging the transfer and the consideration for the transfer. Such a disclosure
will assist the court in dealing with evils that may arise out of post-bankruptcy traffic
in claims against an estate.
Id. Advisory Committee's Note to 1983 Amendment.
The requirement of a statement of consideration was removed, however, in 1991, with the
Advisory Committee Report stating as follows:

.

Subdivision (e) is amended to limit the court's role to the adjudication of disputes
regarding transfers of claims. If a claim has been transferred prior to the filing of a
proof of claim, there is no need to state the consideration for the transfer or to
submit other evidence of the transfer. . . . In that event, the clerk should note the
transfer without the need for court approval. If a timely objection is filed, the court's
role is to determine whether a transfer has been made that is enforceable under
nonbankruptcy law. This rule is not intended either to encourage or discourage
postpetition transfers of claims . . .
Id. Advisory Committee's Note to 1991 Amendment.
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To be sure, claims trading is not all bad. Indeed, it may often be good. As
a "behavioral" matter, a claims trader who buys at $2o and sells at $30 feels
different having gained $1o and may negotiate with clearer eyes than a
creditor who loaned $ioo and is losing $70.28 Similarly, the availability of an
economic exit through a liquid market for claims may make the debt itself
more valuable, and may thus reduce the cost of credit. 9 On the other hand,
to the extent that claims carry with them voting rights, they also create the
ability to transfer control. Therefore, the ability to buy into a bankruptcy
provides an opportunity to buy control on the cheap-at least relative to the
pre-distress creditors. Moreover, the seller of a control block may be able to
sell that control at a premium-a control premium.
Thus, we have identified two potentially problematic types of creditors,
at least from the perspective of "one-dollar, one-vote." The first type is a
creditor that benefits from the debtor's failure-a short. Neither of us is tall,
so we have never liked the derogatory term "shorts." Therefore, we borrow
the word "Schadenfreude"-takingpleasure in the misfortune of others-from
German to describe as "Schadenfreude investors" those who wish for (and
benefit from) the misfortune of the debtor. The second type is the creditor
who has purchased control on the cheap and wishes to throw its weight
around-a bargain basement bully (hereinafter, just a "bully").
The difference is important. A Schadenfreude investor has made a bet on
a particular distributional outcome-the economic interest. A bully, by
contrast is concerned with power-governance. Separately, neither is
particularly problematic. However, there is yet a third type of problematic
creditor: one who links the economic short interest to governance power
purchased on the cheap-a Schadenfreude investor who is also a bully. The
combination of conflicted interest and power is dangerous, especially when
economic positions are not transparent. At that point, the claimant may
become, in effect, a "Trojan Horse." To the extent that the Bankruptcy Code
embodies certain distributional principles, the "Trojan Horse" creditor may
seek to distort them. Worse yet, when such a creditor purchases control on
the cheap and uses it to realize on a short position, it does not just reallocate
the value of the debtor firm, but actually destroys it.
We are not the first to identify this dynamic. Professors Henry T.C. Hu
and Bernard Black, somewhat less colorfully describe a creditor who has
delinked economic interest and governance rights as an "empty creditor."3o

28.
While this argument is frequently made by advocates of claims trading, we are not
entirely convinced. It seems to us to simply be an example, and exaltation, of the sunk cost
fallacy.
The ability to make an economic exit, however, seems to be an unalloyed good, unless
it
undercuts governance.
29.

SeeAdamJ. Levitin, Bankruptcy Markets: Making Sense of Claims Trading, 4 BROOK.J. CORP.

FIN. & COM. L. 67, 73, 93 (2oog).

30.
Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, Debt, Equity and Hybrid Decoupling: Governance and
Systemic Risk Implications, 14 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 663, 68o (2oo8) [hereinafter
Hu & Black, Debt,
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This Article amplifies and further explores those concerns. We explore the
extent to which the problem in bankruptcy is magnified by claims trading
after insolvency, and consider whether bankruptcy law can be adapted to
realign economic interest and governance rights.
We go further, however, than Hu and Black. Our concerns go beyond
role
governance alone, and loop back to concerns about distribution. The
as
But,
contested.3'
and
complex
is
and meaning of "equity" in bankruptcy
a
on
premised
is
Code
one of us has explained elsewhere, the Bankruptcy
position
relative
the
on
principle of equal distribution of a firm's value based
of creditors established on the date of the bankruptcy petition.3 To the extent
that a control premium can be realized by certain stakeholders and not others
who were similarly situated on the petition date, the principle of equality of
distribution is violated. We therefore consider whether "claims purchasers,"
as well as "shorts" should have their claims discounted.33 Finally, we recognize
that the "property rights" of secured creditors can confer practical leverage
that allows them to use control over the debtor's property to distort the
Bankruptcy Code's distributional scheme.34
We conclude that the current tools available under the Bankruptcy Code
are inadequate to the problems posed by credit derivatives and claims trading
more generally. We propose an approach that we call "mark-to-market
governance." This approach has four components:
(i) improved disclosure requirements mandating that certain
claimants reveal the timing of their purchase, the price, and
their true economic position;
(2) proportional designation of hedged creditors' votes that would
cause their voting rights to mirror their actual economic interest
(a process we refer to as "mark-to-interest");

and
Equity and Hybrid Decoupling]; Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, Equity and Debt Decoupling
Empty Voting Hl: Importanceand Extensions,

156 U.

PA. L. REV. 625, 728-29 (2008) [hereinafter Hu

& Black, Equity and Debt Decoupling and Empty Voting 11]; Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, Hedge
and Hidden
Funds, Insiders, and the Decoupling of Economic and Voting Oumership: Empty Voting

(Morphahle)Ownership, i 3J. CORP. FIN. 343, 348-49 (2007) [hereinafter Hu & Black, Hedge Funds,

The
Insiders, and the Decoupling of Economic and Voting Ownership]; Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black,
5
(2006)
81
1,
8
1
REV.
L.
CAL.
S.
Ownership,
(Morphahle)
79
New Vote Buying: Empty Voting and Hidden
[hereinafter Hu & Black, The New Vote Buying].
688 ("An 'Equitable Snapshot'
CompareJacoby&Janger, TracingEquity, supranote 4, at
3.

as of the
establishes the relative position of creditors as of the petition date. The Snapshot fixes,
petition date, the relative positions of unsecured creditors in relation to one another for purposes
and
of pari passu distribution. It also establishes the relationship between secured (asset-based)
David
unsecured (firm-based) claims by fixing the pool of collateral that is encumbered."), with
A. Skeel,Jr., The Empty Idea of "Equalityof Creditors," 166 U. PA. L. REV. 699, 714 (2018) (asserting
that the equality principle is easily avoided in practice).
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Jacoby &Janger, TracingEquity, supranote 4, at 713.
Se.e infra Part III.
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(3) allocation of governance rights to claims purchasers based on
their basis (purchase price) to prevent trading based on control
premia (a process we refer to as "mark-to-basis"); and
(4) limitation of secured creditors' right to credit bid in an asset sale
to the value of a secured creditor's collateral itself (the allowed
secured claim), exclusive of any control premium or bankruptcy
created value (a process we refer to as "mark-to-value").
We acknowledge that this approach is not a panacea, but argue that it is a tool
that should be added to the existing governance toolkit.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part II develops the phenomenon of
"empty voting"-the separation of economic interest and
voting rights-and
reviews the mechanisms by which it can be accomplished in bankruptcy cases.
Part III explores the dynamics of empty voting within the context of particular
bankruptcy cases and illustrates the problems empty voting can create. Part
IV reviews the existing bankruptcy remedies for empty voting and their
limitations. Part V proposes a solution based on the concept of mark-tomarket governance rights. We offer a practical approach to enforcing the
principle of "one dollar, one vote" and consider possible objections. We
conclude by outlining what is possible within the existing legal framework and
which the statutory adjustments would be required to implement a full markto-market governance system.35
II.

EMPTY VOTING AND EMPTY CREDITORS IN BANKRUpTCY
A.

EMPTY VOTING

The academic literature on corporate governance has recognized the
negative consequences that can follow when a firm's owner's economic
interest in a firm is separated from that owner's voting rights as a
shareholder.36 This phenomenon has been described as "empty voting."37
Most investors purchase stock based on an economic bet. They hope that the
company-and their ownership interest in it-will increase in value or yield
dividends. Based on this assumption, stockholders are given the power to vote
on corporate directors and on certain major corporate decisions. It is
possible, therefore, to purchase stock in a company and influence the
company's fate. These control rights have economic value, at least if one has
accumulated enough stock to wield influence38 Usually, the control rights are
See infra Part VI.
See Shaun Martin & Frank Partnoy, Encumbered Shares, 2005 U. ILL. L. REv. 775,
776-78.
37. See Hu & Black, Debt, Equity and Hybrid Decoupling, supra note 30, at 68o; Hu & Black,
Equity and Debt Decoupling and Empty VotingII, supra note 3o, at 728-29;
Hu & Black, Hedge Funds,
Insiders, and the DecouplingofEconomic and Voting Ownership, supra
note 30, at 348-49; Hu & Black,
The New Vote Buying, supranote 3o, at 815.
38.
While creditors are usually characterized as fixed claimants, creditors can influence
corporate governance decisions, even outside of bankruptcy.
Corporate debt obligations-notes,
35.

36.
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exercised in disputes about how to increasethe value of the firm, but they can
also be exercised in fights over how to allocate that value, or to shift risk
allocations within the firm.
For example, it is possible to hedge one's position, and thereby limit
one's exposure to the company's future financial risks. "Hedging" may serve
to
legitimate purposes, such as reducing a stockholder's economic exposure
affect
also
may
hedging
But
market fluctuations and facilitating planning.
stockholder incentives. A hedged investor, with its downside covered, may
prefer riskier strategies, or engage in suboptimal monitoring.
More troubling, however, is that a stockholder may "insure" more stock
than it owns (because no insurable interest is required to purchase a "short"
declines.
position). Such a stockholder will benefit on net if the stock price
their
exercise
to
incentive
economic
an
Accordingly, the investor will have
concerns
these
below,
governance rights to harm the company. As we explain
arise in bankruptcy as well.
B.

EMPTY GOVERNANCE IN ASSET-BACKED SECURITIES

Securitizations present a parallel problem. In a securitization, the assets
are managed on a day-to-day basis by an entity called a servicer.39 The servicer
maintains control over the securitized assets (generally loans)-a position
analogous to governance rights in a firm-and thus is in a position to affect
assetthe performance of the securitized assets and hence the value of the
backed security ("ABS").4o The servicer is a presumptively long party to a
securitization because of its reputational risk, because its compensation
in
depends on the volume of performing assets, and because it is responsible
some situations for advancing payments on defaulted loans.4, Likewise, the
a quasioriginator of the assets and the sponsor of the securitization deal have
the
for
assets
the
selecting
and
governance role in terms of creating
on
parties
long
presumptively
are
securitization. The originator and sponsor
not
do
assets
securitized
the
the ABS because of their reputational risk and, if
conform to representations and warranties, their risk of having to repurchase
2
the assets.4
The servicer is in a position to take steps to decrease the value of the
securitized assets and hence of the ABS. If the servicer is hedged and a net
short, it might be incentivized to act to decrease the value of the ABS.
bonds, debentures, and loans-contain various covenants that place restrictions on the obligor's
of certain
activities, such as mergers, acquisitions, sales, and borrowing, or require maintenance
a
creditors
certain
give
and
autonomy
managerial
limit
covenants
debt
These
financial targets.
measure of control over corporate governance.
RESTRUCTURING AND MODERN
39. See ADAM J. LEVITIN, BUSINESS BANKRUPTCY: FINANCIAL
COMMERCIAL MARKETS 124 (2d ed. 2019).

40.
41.
42.

See id.
YALEJ. ON REG. 1, 24 (201 1).
SeeAdamJ. Levitin & Tara Twomey, MortgageServicing, 28
See LEVITIN, supra note 39, at 125-
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Likewise, if the originator or sponsor are in fact net short on the ABS, they
might be incentivized to securitize poorer quality assets in order to boost the
value of their short position.
The problem of empty governance has already been partially addressed
in the context of asset-backed securities. Regulation AB II, the revised
Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") regulation for offerings of
ABS, requires that the originator, sponsor, and the servicer disclose any hedge
(including by an affiliate) related to the credit risk on the asset-backed
securities.43 This disclosure mandate is backed up by both public enforcement
by the SEC and private rights of action.44 Additionally, the sponsor, depositor,
and issuing entity have to disclose any material business relationships with any
other entity involved in the securitization that is outside of the ordinary course
of business or on non-arm's length terms.45 This means that any attempt at
buying influence of the servicer or trustee or other party involved in the
securitization through transactions at non-arm's length terms would have to
be disclosed.
C.

EMPTY CREDITORS

Outside of bankruptcy, or at least absent default, creditors do not
generally have formal governance rights. Indeed, a number of doctrines even
prohibit creditors from exercising control to disadvantage other creditors.4 6
43.
44.

17C.F.R.§§229.110 4 (g),22 9 .,lo8(e), 2 29 .lllo(b)( 3 ) (2018).
15 U.S.C. § 77 h-1 (2012) (allowing public enforcement by the SEC); id. § 7 7 k (allowing
private enforcement); id. § 771 (allowing private enforcement).
45.

17C.F.R.§22 9 .1

1 19

(b).

46.
See, e.g., Pepper v. Litton, 3o8 U.S. 295, 311 (1939) (discussing equitable subordination
and equitable disallowance); Taylor v. Standard Gas & Elec.
Co., 306 U.S. 307, 308-09, 324
( 939) (discussing recharacterization); Bergquist v. First Nat'l Bank of St. Paul (In reAm. Lumber
Co.), 7 B.R. 519, 529 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1979) (discussing equitable subordination).

It should be noted that in restructurings involving public debt, empty voting may occur. See
William W. Bratton & AdamJ. Levitin, The New Bond Workouts, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 1597, 1635-36
(2018) (discussing empty voting in out-of-court debt restructurings, which takes on a different
flavor). Empty voting can occur in out-of-court restructurings of corporate debt. Id. Publiclyissued corporate debt securities ("bonds") are subject to a federal securities law known as the
Trust Indenture Act, which prohibits the impairment of a bondholder's right to payment without
that individual bondholder's consent. 15 U.S.C- § 77PPP(b). This ability to withhold consent
from a restructuring means that individual bondholder can holdout and free ride on the
restructuring benefits; all of the concessions made to achieve the restructuring are borne by the
consenting bondholders. See Bratton & Levitin, supra, at 16o8. The Trust Indenture Act thus
enables individual bondholders to holdout in the face of proposed restructurings of payment
terms, which in turn discourages other bondholders from accepting restructuring proposals
because they must bear the cost of paying the holdouts. Id.
The bond issuer response is to use so-called "exit consents" to coerce bondholder
acceptance of debt exchange offers. Id. at 16o9-io. In an exit consent transaction, an exchange
offer will be paired with a preceding vote to strip out various covenants that indirectly protect the
bondholders' right to payment. Id. The result is to make the unexchanged bonds less valuable,
and thereby encourage acceptance of the exchange offer. Id. Exit consents involve a type of empty
voting, because the exchanging bondholders are voting to strip out covenants-change
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But things change both as a practical matter upon insolvency, and as a formal
matter in bankruptcy.47 Creditors have the power to influence the conduct of
the case in various ways, and acquire key governance rights with regard to
bankruptcy plan confirmation. The junior creditors, who hold the residual
(and hence variable) claim to the firm's value, become, in effect, the "owners'
of an insolvent company, and investors in this so-called "fulcrum" security may
actually gain control of the reorganized firm upon exit from bankruptcy.4

8

The distribution to them under a Chapter i plan may be a controlling
interest in the equity of the reorganized firm.49
Prior to plan confirmation, creditors have voice, both individually and
collectively, through creditors' committees.5o Unsecured creditors can object
to non-ordinary course transactions during the bankruptcy case.s Unsecured
creditors also have the power to vote on the plan (if their claims are impaired)
2
and insist upon certain minimal distributions of assets.5 Secured creditors too
have the right to vote if impaired.53 They can insist upon a distribution that
matches the value of their encumbered collateral,54 and have a right to
"adequate protection" against depreciation of their collateral.55 Indeed, they
can seek a lifting of the automatic stay-the injunction that comes into place
against collection actions against the debtor upon the filing of the bankruptcy
6
petition-if adequate protection is not provided.5 Finally, lenders that
provide debtor-in-possession financing-new financing for the debtor during
the bankruptcy-often have extraordinary governance rights by contract and
court order, including selection of certain officers of the debtor, the ability to
insist on sales of certain of the debtor's assets, budgets for the 7debtor's
operations, and timelines for the debtor's reorganizational process.5

bondholders are
governance rights-from debt that they will no longer own. Id. The exchanging
Id.
interests.
economic
their
to
unattached
are
that
rights
exercising governance

47.

to exercise their
As we will discuss below, upon default, the practical power of creditors

limits these
remedies grants tremendous holdout power to a variety of key players. Bankruptcy
unilateral veto rights, in exchange for formal governance rights.
Levitin, supra note 29, at 92-94.
772, 790-91, 79 I
49. Jared A. Ellias, Bankruptcy Claims Trading, 15J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDor classes of claims).
n.32 (2018) (noting that claims trading is prevalent in the "fulcrum" class
See LEVITIN, supra note 39, at 367-68.
50.
of the ordinary course of
11 U.S.C. § 3 6 3 (b) (2012) (governing transactions outside
51.
9og (governing the right to be heard).
business); id. §
distribution); id.
Id. § 1 129(a)(7) (asserting the best interest test for minimum
52.
priority test for
absolute
the
(codifying
(ii)
(B)
(2)
(b)
§
id.
(voting);
i
o)
(
(a)
§ i 129(a) (8),
1 129
distributional fairness).
48.

Id.1§ 126.
Id. §§ 7 25, 1129(a)(7), 112 9 (b) (2)(A).
55- Id. § 362 (d) (i).
56. Id.
Financing, 28
LEVITIN, supra note 39, at 409-11; Sris Chatterjee et al., Debtor-in-Possession
57.
J. BANKING & FIN. 3097, 3098-99 (2004) (detailing terms of DIP loans).
53.

54.
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The assumption underlying bankruptcy law is that these powers will be
exercised by stakeholders with mutually aligned interests to maximize their
recovery. Because interests are aligned, this rational behavior will serve to
maximize the value of the firm. If, however, the economic interest of a
creditor diverges from the interest listed in its proof of claim, conflicts of
interest can arise that may impair the ability of the debtor and other
stakeholders to engage in value-maximizing decision-making. As a result, the
"empty voting" problem appears in bankruptcy as an "empty
creditor"
problem, at least in theory.58 As noted, Professors Henry Hu and Bernard
Black have published a controversial article describing what they call the
"empty creditor" hypothesis,59 but the problem they identify
does not appear
to be merely theoretical. Indeed, the "empty voting" problem appears to be a
driving force in the run-up to many of the most contested bankruptcies of
recent years.60
For example, in the lead up to Caesars Entertainment's bankruptcy,
Caesars alleged that some of its second-lien noteholders were seeking to
thwart an out-of-court restructuring in order to bolster the value of credit
default swaps they held on Caesars. 6' Likewise, there was speculation that
prior to the Chrysler bankruptcy some of the secured creditors had hedged
their positions, encouraging them to engage in holdout behavior.6 2 Similar
speculation existed for Tower Automotive's bankruptcy. 63
In the Lyondell Chemical bankruptcy, the judge even noted that it had
been reported that "certain holders of credit default swaps have attempted to
aggregate [a sufficient percentage of the debtor's notes] in order to
accelerate them and create a 'termination event' that would entitle them to

58. Hu & Black, Equity and Debt Decoupling and Emply Voting II, supra note 3o, at 731-32; see
also Patrick Bolton & Martin Oehmke, Credit Default Swaps and the Empty Creditor
Problem, 24 REV.
FIN. STUD. 2617, 2618 (2011) (arguing that "a creditor with a [credit default
swaps] contract
may indeed be more reluctant to restructure the debt of a distressed debtor . . ."); Yesha
Yadav,
Empty Creditorsand Sovereign Debt: What Now?, 9 CAP. MKTS. L.J. 103, 104 (2014) (stating how"[o]
n
the surface, credit protection sellers and protection buyers [of CDS] appear locked in battle").
59. Hu & Black, Equity and Debt Decouplingand Empty Voting II, supra note 30, at 728.
6o. See Daniel Hemel, Comment, Empty Creditorsand Debt Exchanges, 27 YALEJ. ON REG.
159,
I6o-61 (2010) (noting cases of alleged empty creditor behavior in the run-up to bankruptcy); Is
the 'Empty Creditor' Theory Itself Empty?, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK

(Dec.

21, 2009, 4:54 AM),

https://dealbook.nytimes.com/200 9 /12/21/is-the-empty-creditor-theory-just-empty
(detailing
alleged empty creditor situations in international restructurings); see also Henry T.C. Hu, Financial
Innovation

and Governance Mechanisms: The Evolution of Decoupling and Transparency,
70 Bus. LAW. 347, 371-72 (2015) (detailing several recent high-profile bankruptcies).

61.

Complaint at 22, Caesars Entm't Operating Co. v. Appaloosa Inv. Ltd. P'ship 1, 48 Misc.
3 d 1212(A) (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 5, 2014) (No. 652392/2014).
62.
See Mark A. Hofmann, TARP Inspector Asked to Probe CDS Link to Automakers, Bus.
INS.
(May 6, 2009), https://www.businessinsurance.com/article/20o o o6/NEWS/
9

5

2

ooo 6128.

63.
Frank Partnoy& David A. Skeel,Jr., The Promise and Perils of Credit Derivatives, 75 U. CIN.
L. REV. 1019, 1034-35 (2007).
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6
payment on the credit default swaps from their swap counterparties." 4 Even
noted
putting aside the alleged bad behavior, the Lyondell Chemical court
that
[m]any of the objecting parties [to a stay of collection actions against
non-debtor guarantors] are holders of the 2015 Notes ("2015
Noteholders"), though some are also parties to credit default swaps
that protect such holders from the risk of nonpayment-and whose
interests are materially different from those who simply hold the
in
2015 Notes. Expressing a concern that is increasingly common
2015
the
of
some
Court,
in
this
cases
ii
the large chapter
Noteholders argue that they would be affected much more
dramatically by an inability to recover on the 2015 Notes than a 2015
6
Noteholder with a credit default swap would. 5
Similarly, it was noted that when auto parts manufacturer Delphi filed for
bankruptcy, the price of its securities went up because various derivatives
66
needed to be physically settled. The supply of actual debt securities ($2
billion) was not sufficient to meet the derivative market's demand ($25 billion
of credit default swaps ("CDS") coverage outstanding) when all of the
derivatives had to be settled simultaneously, thereby driving up the securities
prices. 67 The same phenomenon appeared with Eastman Kodak, where there
were notional $773 million of CDS outstanding against $i billion of debt
securities, only around $227 million of which appear to reflect hedged "basis
players" who arbitrage between the spreads on the bonds and the spreads on
the CDS. 6 8 The implication is that roughly $5oo million of the CDS on
Eastman Kodak were naked, unhedged bets on the firm's solvency. Notably,
after the CDS auction settlement for Kodak, bond prices rallied, as another
cadre of investors sought to purchase them for purposes of investing in the
6

bankruptcy. 9
The most direct allegation of a creditor taking actions to harm a debtor
in order to collect on derivative positions comes from the on-going
Windstream bankruptcy. In 2015, Windstream, a rural telecommunications
company, engaged in a sale-leaseback transaction that violated the terms of
some of its bond indentures.7o Aurelius, a distressed debt hedge fund,
64. Lyondell Chem. Co. v. CenterPoint Energy Gas Servs. Inc. (In re Lyondell Chem. Co.),
402 B.R. 571, 585 n.26 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009).
Id. at 577-78 (emphasis omitted).
65.
Stephen J. Lubben, Credit Denivatives and the Future of Chapteri i, 8 I AM. BANKR. L.J. 405,
66.
416 (2007).
67.

2,
Id.; Melissa Mott, Kodak CDS Auction Sheds Light on Settlement Process, REUTERS (Mar.
20302.

2012, 3:1 1 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/markets-credit-idUSL2E8E28EZ2o

68.
69.

Mott, supra note 67.
Id.
70. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Windstream Servs., LLC, No.
LEXIS 26129, at *3, *66 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 2019).

I7

-CV-7 8 5 7 (JMF),

2019
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purchased some of Windstream's bonds and then sought to enforce the
covenant default two years after it had occurred.7' Windstream alleged that
Aurelius held a large CDS short position on its bonds, and that Aurelius's
litigation over a technical default was motivated solely by Aurelius's desire to
trigger a payout on its CDS position.72 Following an unsuccessful attempt to
restructure its debts to gain waiver of the default, Windstream filed for
bankruptcy.73
In addition to CDS allegedly being used by shorts to harm debtors,
debtors have sometimes actually collaborated with both longs and shorts
seeking to manipulate their recovery on a CDS position. Perhaps the most
aggressive manipulation of the CDS and related debt markets observed to date
involves Hovnanian Enterprises, a large homebuilder.74 GSO Capital Partners,
a hedge fund embedded in the Blackstone Group, one of the world's largest
private equity firms, purchased some $330 million in CDS protection on
Hovnanian's debt from Solus Alternative Asset Management LP, another
hedge fund.75 GSO then offered to refinance some of Hovnanian's debt on
substantially below market terms.7 6 The refinancing included the
requirement that Hovnanian issue some new debt to a Hovnanian affiliate
and then default on that debt by making a $1.04 million interest payment to
its affiliate a few days late, at a time when Hovnanian had over $500 million
cash on hand.77 The default was too small to trigger cross-default clauses on
Hovnanian's other obligations, but was just large enough to trigger a credit
event on the CDS.78 Moreover, the new debt issued by Hovnanian to
its

affiliate was itself on substantially below market terms, thereby depressing the
market price of the debt.79 Because the payout on the CDS is based on
the

pricing of the cheapest-to-deliver debt of the entity referenced in the swap,
71.

.

Id. at * 3 , *2 4
72.
Windstream Holdings, Inc., Windstream Holdings, Inc. Files for Voluntary Reorganization
Under Chapter ii of the US. Bankruptcy Code Following Judge Furman's Decision,
WINDSTRFAM
(Feb. 25, 2019), http://news.windstream.com/news-releases/news-release-details/windstreamholdings-inc-files-voluntary-reorganization-under.
73.
Declaration of Tony Thomas, Chief Executive Officer and President of Windstream
Holdings, Inc., (I) in Support of Debtors' Chapter Ii Petitions and First
Day Motions and (II)
Pursuant to Local Bankruptcy Rule 1007-2, In reWindstream Holdings,
Inc. at 11 9- 10, 14, No.
19-22312 (RDD) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2019) (No. 27), http://www.kccllc.net/windstream/
document/1 9 2g2 3 1
9022500000000040.
74.
Ilovnanian EnterprisesInc. CIA, BARRON's, https://www.barrons.com/quote/stock/us/
xnys/hov/company-people (last visited Mar. 9, 2019).
75.
2018,

Mary Childs, The Hedge Fund Skirmish that Could Kill the CDS Market, BARRON'S (Jan. 26,

7:32

PM),

https://www.barrons.com/articles/the-hedge-fund-batte-that-could-kill-the-

cds-market-1 517013136.

76.

Solus Alt. Asset Mgmt. LP v. GSO Capital Partners L.P., No.

WL 62049o, at *I (S.D.N.YJan. 29, 2018).
77.
78.

Id. at *4Id.

79.

Id.

18 CV 232-LTS-BCM, 2o 18
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the issuance of the below market debt ensured that the payout to GSO would
be larger.o Lest this be thought a "one-off," GSO had previously engaged in
a similar transaction involving the CDS on the Spanish gaming conglomerate
Codere, SA, a deal that merited mention on The Daily Show.8'

Moreover, GSO was not alone in playing the CDS manipulation game.
Solus-the protection seller to Hovnanian-had itself unsuccessfully offered
Hovnanian below market financing that would have been coupled with "an
unusual provision under which Hovnanian would be in default under Sollu]s'
financing instruments if any failure by Hovnanian to pay any of its debt
obligations constituted a failure to pay Credit Event with respect to CDS
contracts.""8 Apparently, the debtor accepted the better offer. They chose to
trigger the payout on a CDS. Litigation over the Hovnanian transaction
settled,83 but it shows how players with short positions via CDS can engage in
manipulative transactions with the entity whose debt is referenced by the
8
CDS. 4

So.

Id.

Stephanie Ruble et al., Blackstone Unit Wins in No-Lose Codere Trade: Corporate Finance,
8 i.
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 22, 2013, 10:02 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2o13-oalso The Daily Show withjon
22/blackstone-unit-wins-in-no-lose-codere-trade-corporate-finance; see
Stewart: Blackstone & Codere, COMEDY CENT. (Dec. 4, 2013), http://www.cc.com/video-

(covering-in a comedic
clips/og8sum/the-daily-show-with-jon-stewart-blackstone-codere
by
manner-GSO's nefarious behavior and highlighting the lack of coverage of this transaction
2 4 -hour financial news networks).
82. Solus Alt. Asset MgmL. LP, 2018 WL 62049o, at *3.

Fight Over Hovnanian CDS
Claire Boston & Sridhar Natarajan, Blackstone, Solus Settle
83.
8https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/201
PM),
Trade, BLOOMBERG (May 30, 201 8, 6:oo

05-30/ hovnanian-pays-overdue-intereston-bonds-within-grace-period.
situation, in which
Radio Shack's bankruptcy illustrates the flip-side of the Hovnanian
84.
Some of Radio
market.
the
of
manipulation
the
in
engage
creditors
short,
long, rather than
making them extra
Shack's creditors had allegedly sold CDS protection on Radio Shack debt,
BARRON'S (Dec. 19,
long. See Michael Aneiro, What's Keeping Radio Shack Ajloat? Credit Derivatives,
2014), https://www.barrons.com/articles/whats-keeping-radio-shack-afloat-credit-derivativesdefault, these creditors extended a new
1419003199. When it appeared that Radio Shack would
the credit default swaps. See id.
loan to Radio Shack so that it would only default after the expiration of
International Swaps and
the
Codere,
and
Hovnanian
like
In reaction to situations
to "re-defin[e] failure to
Derivatives Association ("ISDA") announced in March 2019 a proposal
to pay that are not
failures
exclude
to
Agreement
Master
its
pay" under "credit event" as part of
Benjamin
causally linked with a deterioration of a firm's creditworthiness or financial condition.
6, 2019,
(Mar.
BLOOMBERG
Trades,
CDS
Shady
Up
Clean
to
Bain et al., Wall Street Titans Cut Deal
/wall-street-titans-said-too:oo AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/201 9 -o3 - 5
The proposal,
cut-deal-to-clean-up-shady-cds-trades (internal quotation marks omitted).
Futures Trading
undertaken in the shadow of a threat of regulation by the Commodities
debt transactions to
Commission, would limit the ability of investors to engage in corporate
to exploit combined CDS
manipulate CDS, but it would leave untouched the ability of investors
AMENDMENTS TO
and debt positions. See generally INT'L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS'N, PROPOSED
TO NARROWLY TAILORED CREDIT
THE 2014 ISDA CREDIT DERIVATIVES DEFINITIONS RELATING

https://www.isda.org/a/nyKME/2019o 3 o6-NTCE-consultation-doc-complete.pdf
holder
amendments and explaining the reasoning behind them). A CDS
proposed
the
(stating
a
triggering
a
restructuring-thereby
in
cooperate
to
refuse
may
who holds bonds or other debt

EVENTS (2019),
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While most evidence of empty creditor behavior shows up in the
distressed debt market on the threshold of bankruptcy, there are some
indications that it may be continuing in bankruptcy. In broadband
communication company LightSquared's bankruptcy, entities affiliated with
DISH Network, a competitor of the debtor, allegedly purchased the debtor's
secured debt in the bankruptcy claims market in order to block a
reorganization plan pushed by the debtor's controlling shareholder.85
Another DISH-affiliated entity also made a low-ball asset purchase offer in
order to confuse the market regarding the value of the debtor's assets and
thereby chill bidding.8 6 Similarly, in broadband company DBSD's bankruptcy,
DISH Network again attempted to block a plan by purchasing a position in
DBSD's secured debt. 87 DISH's supposed goal in this scheme was to force

DBSD into a strategic transaction with DISH by precluding alternative
transactions.88
Likewise, while bankruptcy constitutes a "credit event" for CDS that
entitles the protection buyer to terminate the swap and collect payment, the
payout on the CDS to the protection buyer is not immediate. The payout
amount on the CDS is calculated based on the clearing price in an auction for
the referenced debt conducted by the International Swaps and Derivatives
Association ("ISDA"). The ISDA auction date is set by an ISDA
Determinations Committee, 89but may easily take place a month or more after
the bankruptcy filing, depending on the complexity of the legal issues that
need to be addressed regarding the auction, such as precisely which debt
instruments are eligible for inclusion in the auction. The auction mechanics
are complicated and need not concern us here; the bottom line is that the
higher the auction price of the covered debt obligations, the lower the payout
on the CDS by the protection sellers.
The delay between the bankruptcy filing and the ISDA CDS clearing
auction means that parties invested in CDS have a post-bankruptcy exposure
window. Post-bankruptcy exposure creates an incentive for the swap
counterparties to attempt to affect the fortunes of the debtor firm in order to
affect the market value of the debt insured by the CDS and thereby increase

.

default and increasing their CDS recovery. In other words, even if the ISDA proposal is adopted,
it will not affect the empty creditor problem, but only what one might term the "empty
counterparty." The situation alleged to exist in Lyondell and Windstream is thus not addressed
by the ISDA proposal.
85. Harbinger Capital Partners LLC v. Ergen (In re LightSquared
Inc.), 504 B.R. 321,
332-33 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2013).
86. Id. at 3 3 3
87. Dish Network Corp. v. DBSD N. Am., Inc. (In reDBSD N.
Am., Inc.), 634 F. d 79, 104
(2d Cir. 2010).

88.
89.

3

Id.
Int'l Swaps & Derivatives Ass'n, The Credit Event Process, at slide 1 2 (last visited Mar.
9, 2o19), available at https://www.isda.org/a/cKwEE/TheCreditEventProcess.pdf.
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(in the case of protection buyers) or decrease (in the case of protection
sellers) the payouts on CDS.
Thus, in Sears' bankruptcy, the hedge fund Cyrus Partners LP had sold
CDS protection on Sears debt.9o Cyrus first attempted to prevent Sears from
selling certain pre-existing intercompany obligations into the market because
of a concern that those obligations could be bid into the CDS clearing auction
and by virtue of expanding the pool of debt, lower the auction price and
therefore increase the payout on the CDS.9' Having failed to prevent the sale
of the intercompany obligations, Cyrus then bought the notes itself,92 even as
it lobbied ISDA to make the intercompany obligations ineligible for the
auction. And finally, Cyrus made a second-lien DIP loan to Sears, which
increased the likelihood of Sears' survival and thus the value of its bonds,
which reduced the payout on the CDS.93 Cyrus is a case of a party pursuing
it's
governance strategies based on being extraneously long on the debtor, but
who
buyers,
protection
CDS
by
notable that Cyrus was opposed in its efforts
were short on Sears. Both longs and shorts in the CDS market have an interest
in affecting corporate governance in bankruptcy because of the delay between
bankruptcy and the determination of the payouts on the CDS.
Although Hu and Black recognize that there may be an empty voting
problem in bankruptcy, they do not identify the extent to which it goes to the
very heart of the bankruptcy system. As a response, Hu and Black principally
propose an enhanced disclosure regime. They passingly acknowledge that
disclosure may be insufficient, and that adjustment of voting rights may be
necessary.94 But the problem runs deeper than they recognize-going to the
very heart of the Code's distributional scheme. Accordingly, they do not seek
to operationalize this suggestion, nor do they explore when and why
disclosure may be insufficient.95 Hu and Black work from a straight analogy
to the "empty voting" problem with regard to equity investments in a solvent

Influencing Credit
90. Jessica DiNapoli, Sears Investors Claim Hedge Fund Cyrus Improperly
Market: Letter, REUTERS (Nov. 20, 2018, 7:24 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-searsban kruptcy-cyrus/sears-investors-claim-hedge-fund-cyrus-improperly-influencing-credit-market-

letter-idUSKCNiNQo 4 K
91. See id.
WALL ST.J.
Andrew Scurria, Sears's $82.5 Million Note Sale to Cyrus Is Throwm into Doubt,
92.
(Dec. 20, 2018, 7:20 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/searss-82-5-million-note-sale-to-cyrus-isthrown-into-doubt-i 1545351623.
ST.J. (Nov. 27,
93. Lillian Rizzo, Sears FindsNew Bankruptcy Loan Lender in Swap Seller, WALL
2018, 7:42 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/sears-finds-new-bankruptcy-loan-lender-in-swap-

seller-i543365721.
94. See Hu & Black, Debt, Equity and Hybrid Decoupling, supra note 30, at 684-85.
plan voting, the use of asset sales
95. Id. (suggesting that given the problems of conflicted
but noting the problem of credit
preferable,
be
might
reorganization
effectuate
to
voting
without

Voting II, supranote
bidding by empty creditors); Hu & Black, Equity and Debt Decouplingand Empty

3o, at 731-32.
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company.9 6 Because of this, they do not recognize ways in which insolvency
changes the landscape both as a strategic matter-altering the practical and
legal power held by a Trojan Horse creditor-and as a policy matter
-implicating the bankruptcy policy of equitable distribution of firm value
(discussed in the next subpart).
Schadenfreudecreditors, bullies, and Trojan Horse creditors in bankruptcy
raise additional concerns that may require more aggressive intervention than
Hu and Black recognize. First, claims trading in distress situations implicates
more than ownership. The future of the firm and its very viability are at stake.
Second, control rights may be purchased at a discount. Third, the Bankruptcy
Code, by design, gives more voice to various creditor constituencies, making
it even easier to obtain a blocking position. And fourth, to the extent that this
leverage changes hands after insolvency, it creates opportunities to distort the
Bankruptcy Code's priority scheme. In this Article, we seek to identify the full
breadth of situations where such governance distortions occur (including
with regard to secured creditors) and suggest a practical approach to
remedying their effects.
D.

EMPTY CREDITORS, EcoNOMICEXITANDEQUALITY OFDISTRIBUTION

As the preceding section shows, the empty creditor problem can arise
both as a result of trading in claims of the debtor, and through the purchase
of related assets.97 The key point developed above is that control rights have

economic value that is separate and distinct from the economic interest
underlying the claim, and that they can be used in ways that harm the debtor
or other claimants. This is a governance problem because it can create
conflicts of interest (loyalty), that distorts the way governance rights (voice)
are used. It also complicates the problem of exit. It creates a distinction
between creditors who make an economic exit by selling their claim, from
those who sell at a premium because they exit by selling into a control block.
This exit distinction has governance implications, because an ordinary
creditor who sells to a Trojan Horse creditor not only receives a premium on
the value of their claim, the governance rights associated with that claim may
be used to harm the remaining incumbent shareholders, either to reduce the
value of the debtor or reallocate value. This raises separate and distinct
concerns about the bankruptcy policy of equality of distribution and its
interaction with governance rights.
There are many benefits to allowing creditors to assign their claims after
bankruptcy-to make an economic exit. They may not be well equipped to
participate in a bankruptcy case.98 They might prefer to recognize their losses,

96.

Hu & Black, Debt, Equity and Hybiid Decoupling, supra note 30, at 684-85; Hu & Black,

Equity and Debt Decoupling and Empty Voling II, supra note 3o, at 731-32.
97.
See supraSection II.C.

98.

See Levitin, sutpra note 29, at 93.
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etc.99 Also, a market for claims, at least to the extent it is transparent, provides
information about the value of the firm, because it indicates the market's
valuation of different claims on the capital structure of the firm; to the extent
that the market places a low value on a claim, it is an indication that the
market believes that the firm is worth less than the aggregate amount of all
senior claims. Critically, claims trading does not distort the relative position
of claims.
However, where governance rights are part of the proposed trade, this is
not the case. To understand this point requires a brief discussion of a deeper
point about the Bankruptcy Code, and Chapter 1 1 in particular. In Tracing
Equity: Realizing and Allocating Value in Chapter ii, Edward Janger and Melissa
00
Jacoby explain the concept of equality of distribution in bankruptcy.o
Chapter i1 allows a debtor to delay realization of the value of the firm,
and therefore of claims, beyond the filing date.-o To do this the Code must
establish a way of allocating changes in the value of the firm over time, which
it does by separating the process of realization into two moments, through a
of
process that we call, "Equitable Realization." Those two moments
realization are: (1) the filing of the bankruptcy petition; and (2) plan
confirmation or collateral realization.
At the moment of the bankruptcy filing, Equitable Realization occurs,
and the relative positions of creditors are fixed. Unsecured creditors' claims
are fixed relative to each other, o and the pool of encumbered assets is fixed
as well.03 The economic value of their claim, by contrast, is not determined
until the moment of "Value Realization," either the effective date of the plan,
when a distribution is received, or when collateral is disposed of.o
Control rights, to the extent that they inhere in a particular class of
claims, are not an asset of a particular creditor but of the class itself. Also, to
the extent that there is a control premium associated with a block of shares,
that value is not available to the class as a whole, only to those creditors who
sell into the control block. Thus, the distortions created by the Empty
Creditor problem implicate both the bankruptcy policies of value
maximization and equality of distribution, as they alter the relative
distributions of value to creditors within the same class.
E.

MECHANISMS FOR SEPARATING EcoNoMIC INTEREST FROM GOvERNANCE RJGHTS

Debt-based governance rights can be separated from economic interests
in more ways than one might think. In this section we discuss the way

99.
100.
101.
102.

103.
104.

See id.
SeeJacoby &Janger, TracingEquity, supranote 4, at 688-93.
See id. at 684-88.
11 U.S.C.§502 (2012).
Id. § 552.
Id. §§ 5 5 2(b), 112 9 (b)(2)(A).

2019]

ONE DOLLAR, ONE VOTE

1879

derivatives can be used to construct such a mismatch, and then go further.
Derivatives are not the only way to create such a mismatch.o5 Some such
conflicts are more deeply imbedded and harder to address, as discussed in
Section IV.C.

1.

Put Options

The most straightforward way to bet against a debtor would be to
purchase a put option on the debt. o6 Put options enable a creditor to sell its
debt holdings at a fixed strike price. The put option caps the creditor's
downside exposure to the debtor at the strike price, and because the value of
the put option rises as the debt's market value falls, the creditor may be
incentivized to exercise its governance rights to increase the value of the put
option, especially if the put option is for a greater amount than its current
debt holdings. Thus, a creditor might have a put option for $io million at
par, but only hold $3 million in debt. The creditor might use the governance

105. Two other methods of separating economic interest from governance rights are
purchasing debt at a discount from face and securitizations and participations.
Purchasing debt
at a discount from face, whether through secondary market purchase or original
issue discount
means that the governance rights on the debt-including voting rights in bankruptcy-track
the
face amount of the debt, but the economic interest is based on the purchase
price as well as the
face amount. The purchase price represents the maximum downside exposure
for the investor,
even as the face amount represents the maximum upside. Thus, two creditors holding
debts for
identical face amounts, but one having purchased the debt at a steep discount,
have different
incentives in exercising the governance rights associated with that debt.
Likewise, securitization inherently involves a separation of governance rights
over
securitized assets and economic interest in the assets. See Hu & Black, Debt,
Equity and Hybrid
Decoupling, supra note 3o, at 665, 691. The securitization investors maintain the economic
interest
in the assets, but the assets are managed by a servicer and legal title to the assets
is held by either
a trustee or a corporate entity. See id. at 665. As a result, securitization investors
do not get to vote
on bankruptcy plans and even standing to appear in bankruptcy court to raise objections.
See In
8
re Innkeepers USA Tr., 44 B.R. 131, 142-45 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 201 s) (finding
commercial
mortgage securitization investors lack standing to object to sale bidding procedures,
only the
special servicer does); In re Shilo Inn, 285 B.R. 726, 729 (Bankr. D. Or. 2002)
(finding
commercial mortgage securitization investors do not individually have the
right to vote on a
Chapter ii plan, only the special servicer does). Loan participations operate much
the same in
terms of the separation of governance and economic rights-the original lender
maintains legal
title and servicing rights on the loan, while the participants have only. economic
rights. See
LEVITIN, supra note 39, at 81; see also Bayer Corp. v. MascoTech, Inc. (In re
AutoStyle Plastics,

,

Inc.), 269 F. 3 d 726, 736-37 (6th Cir. 2001) (explaining operation of
loan participations).
i o6. See, e.g., Arturo Bris et al., Efficiency and the Bear: Short Sales and Markets Around the World,
62J. FIN. 1029, 1070-72 (2007) (explaining how put options function as
a mechanism for taking
a short position); Bartley R. Danielsen & Sorin M. Sorescu, Why Do Option
IntroductionsDepress
Stock Prices?A Study of DiminishingShort Sale Constraints,
36J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 45
454-58 (2001) (explaining the same); Bruce D. Grundy et al., Do Option Markets Undo Restrictions
on. Short Sales? Evidence from the 2oo8 Short-Sale Ban, io6J. FIN. EcoN. 331,
332, 34-41 (2012)
(explaining the same); see also Olagues v. Icahn, 866 F. d 70, 72 n. i
(2d Cir. 2017) ("The buyer
3

of a put option and the seller of a call option, by contrast, anticipate the stock price
to drop (a
short' position).").
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rights on that $3 million to push down the value of the debt and then go and
purchase another $7 million of debt (now trading at a discount).
2.

Credit Default Swaps

Credit derivatives can have a similar effect. For example, a CDS between
buyer when a
a protection buyer and a protection seller pays the protection
either
protection
CDS
via
short
go
can
debtor files for bankruptcy. An investor
debt
referenced
the
of
holding
as a protection buyer without an actual
the
holds
that
buyer
instrument (a "naked short"), or as a protection
than
more
is
but
referenced debt instrument (a "clothed protection buyer"),
affect the
fully-hedged via CDS (a "clothed short"). CDS protection may
willingness of a clothed protection buyer to negotiate a workout prior to
bankruptcy, either by making it easier to favor a risky strategy, or, if short, to
actually seek to trigger the default.
can
CDS can obviously complicate out-of-court debt restructurings. They
07
a
As
bankruptcy.
the
to
run-up
also affect creditor behavior in the
pre-bankruptcy
governance matter this is problematic, because creditors'
behavior may reduce the value of the firm and foreclose potential
restructurings in bankruptcy. Any remedy in bankruptcy would, of course,
have to be imposed ex post.
Critically, however, CDS can also affect creditor behavior at the
and
beginning of bankruptcies. Under the standardized International Swaps
the
by
triggered
be
will
CDS
a
Derivatives Association documentation,
bankruptcy filing itself.os Since 2oog CDS are, by default, settled through

cash-payment at an auction-determined rate, although a physical settlement
option remains.,o9

As noted above, the auction to determine the settlement price does not
occur immediately upon the bankruptcy filing, but at some point thereafter.
The timing of the auction is left to the discretion of an ISDA Determinations
Committee, but the more complicated the legal questions involved
the
-particularly issues about what debt obligations are eligible to be bid in

i 1g YALE L.J. 648, 683 (20 10)
Douglas G. Baird & Robert K Rasmussen, Antibankrupicy,
the Chapter i begins and in
before
only
problem
hazard
moral
a
("Credit default swaps create
its immediate aftermath.").
Agreement
See, e.g., Int'l Swaps & Derivatives Ass'n, Inc., 2002 ISDA Master
io8.
https://
between Bank of Am., N.A. & LKQ Corp. § 5 (a)(vii)(4)(A) (March 22, 2011),
6 6 6
o/dexsos.htm; seealsolNT'L
I80
t
/000119312511
9
5
5
www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/io
SWAPs & DERIvATIVES Ass'N, INC., USER's GUIDE TO THE ISDA 2002 MASTER AGREEMENT 14
("Section
(2003), https://www.isda.org/a/IAEDE/UG-tO-2002-ISDA-Master-Agreement.pdf
party and any applicable
a
of
Provider
Support
Credit
any
party,
5(a) (vii) applies to each
a variety of events associated with
Specified Entity of a party. It is drafted so as to be triggered by
bankruptcy or insolvency .... ).
(20to), http://
See MARKIT & CREDITEX, CREDIT EVENT AUCTION PRIMER 2
1og.
auction
www.creditfixings.com/information/affiliations/fixings/auctions/docs/credit-event
107.

primer.pdf.
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auction-the greater the delay. For example, Sears filed for bankruptcy on
October 15, 2018, but the CDS auction did not take place until January
17,
2019.o During the window between the bankruptcy filing and auction to
determine the CDS settlement price, both protection sellers and protection
buyers are incentivized to take actions to affect the settlement price in their
favor, and this means taking actions to attempt to further or hinder the
debtor's reorganization prospects.
The window between the bankruptcy filing and the CDS auction is likely
to be fairly limited in most cases, however, perhaps a month or so. Once the
CDS settlement price is set, the incentive for CDS counterparties to affect the
debtor firm's prospects disappear. In most situations this means that
bankruptcy voting will be unaffected. Unless there is a pre-packaged or prenegotiated bankruptcy in which voting takes place before or shortly after the
filing of the petition, any vote on a plan will likely be after the CDS settlement
price is fixed."'1
3.

Total Return Swaps

There are other derivative devices that continue to operate, even once a
debtor has filed for bankruptcy. For example, a total return swap ("TRS") is a
swap in which one party to the swap commits to swapping a sum certain for
the total return of the counterparty on a specified reference asset.11 Because
TRS are triggered by the occurrence of a date certain, rather than by a credit
event such as a bankruptcy filing, a TRS can continue to be in place after a
bankruptcy filing, or could even be purchased after a bankruptcy filing.' '3
Thus, if our creditor holds a $io million note and purchases a $12 million
TRS, triggered in three years, that creditor would continue to be net short
throughout the term of the swap, regardless of when, or if, the debtor filed
for bankruptcy.
TRS are a limited subset of credit derivatives' '4 and have not been
specifically linked with bankruptcy empty-creditor problems. But there are
myriad ways for the holder of a claim in bankruptcy to use derivatives to hedge
risk, or take a short position. Simply buying a put option after the bankruptcy
2

io.
See Sears Roebuck Accep Corp CDS Credit Event Auction, CREDITEX (Jan. 17, 2019),
http://www.creditfixings.com/CreditEventAuctions/holdingsjsp?auctionld=g
29 (showing
that the Sears CDS clearing auction was held on January
17 of 2019).
1il. In cases where the bankruptcy is prearranged, or a restructuring support agreement is
negotiated, CDS may affect dynamics as well.
112.
JOHN D. FINNERTY, PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, THE PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS
CREDIT DERIVATIVES PRIMER 6, https://www.pwc.com.tr/en/assets/about/svcs/abas/frm/
creditrisk/surveys/pwc-credderi.pdf (last visited Mar. 9, 2o19).

113.
The duration of TRS can itself affect parties' incentives in a bankruptcy, but that is a
secondary issue.
114.
We have been unable to identify reliable information on the size of the TRS market.
Statistics on the credit derivatives market do not break out TRS separately from CDS.
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on the claim will do.' 's If the claim's value falls beneath the strike price, the
is
option holder will exercise the option and sell the claim. The claimholder
price.
strike
the
below
decline
thus hedged for any
4.

Investment in Competitors

The same is true, derivatives aside, if a creditor has an interest in a
might
competitor of the debtor. The value of the interest in the competitor
6
such
One
liquidates."
and
reorganize
to
unable
is
increase if the debtor
debtor
the
of
competitor
a
where
DBSD,
v.
example occurred in Dish Network
against
bought up claims against the debtor and sought to use them to vote
those
"designated"
court
the
the plan of reorganization., '7 In that case,
8
situation
similar
A
creditors' claims and denied them their voting rights."
was alleged to have occurred in LightSquared (with the same defendant)."9
5.

Investment Across the Capital Structure

Creditors also frequently invest across the capital structure of the
debtor.,2o For example, a first lien secured creditor might also hold an
unsecured position, a second lien position, an equity position, or any of the
above. One might assume that such a creditor would want to maximize the
value of each of its various investments. However, this may not always be the
case. It is possible that the investment in one part of the capital structure may
be for the purposes of obtaining a return, while the investments in the other
parts of the capital structure may be for the purpose of obtaining control, to
be used to increase the return to the creditor's other position(s) in the capital
structure.
Such a creditor's interest and behavior may vary depending on where the
value of the firm lies. If all of the value of a firm can be transferred to the
senior secured creditor through control of ajunior class, the secured creditor
may not have to share with junior creditors. Indeed, it is not unusual for a
secured creditor to privilege its secured claim above its interest as an
unsecured creditor and use its deficiency claim in a way that may actually
harm the other unsecured claimants. 2 Similarly, landlords (who are not
secured creditors, but share an ability to recover specific property) may prefer

on the debt itself.
115. This is distinct from purchasing a put option prepetition
N. Am., Inc.), 634 F. 3 d
DBSD
re
(In
Inc.
Am.,
N.
See, e.g., Dish Network Corp. v. DBSD
i16.
F.2d 395, 400-01 ( 5 th
87
Co.,
Dev.
Waco
v.
Corp.
Sec.
Hotel
Tex.
79, 1o6-o8 (2d Cir. 201o);
Cir. 1936).
Dish Network Corp., 634 F. 3 d at 87, 1o6-o8.
117.

18.
i ig.
120.

Id. at 1o4-o8.
See supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text.
See Hu & Black, Debt, Equity and Hybrid Decoupling, supranote 3o, at 683-84.

See generally Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Loop 76, LLC (In reLoop 76, LLC), 465 B.R. 525
12 1.
(B.A.P. 9 th Cir. 2012) (considering when it is appropriate to separately classify a secured
creditor's deficiency claim).
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to recover the leased premises from the debtor in order to relet the property
at a higher market price than to ensure the debtor's continued viability, which
would improve the possibility of a recovery on their unsecured breach of lease
claims, but might continue to lock them in to a below-market lease.
6.

Investment in Multiple Affiliates

A similar problem arises in cases involving multiple related debtor
entities. 2 2 A creditor might have an interest in more than one affiliated
debtor firm. In such a case, the creditor might be willing to sacrifice a return
on its investment in one entity in order to achieve a greater recovery for its
investment in another entity under ajoint Chapter i 1 plan. Given that not all

creditors in either entity will be similarly invested, there is an inherent
misalignment of interests.
F

23

PROBLEMS CREATED BY SEPARATING EcoNOMIc INTEREST FROM
GOVERNANCE RIGHTS

Thus, there are numerous ways in which a creditor can go short in
bankruptcy and take a Schadenfreude position. Since creditors exercise formal
governance rights in bankruptcy and have informal power when the debtor is
in distress, they can throw their weight around-like a bully. When a conflict
of interest is linked to governance power, the creditor has a strategic incentive
to use that power, not just to take from others, but to reduce the value of the
firm.24

As we will discuss below, this linkage is particularly troubling in
bankruptcy because of: (i) fragmentation; and (2) transparency. With regard
to fragmentation, blocking positions proliferate in bankruptcy (at least as
122.
Most large firms structure themselves as a pyramid of holding companies and
subsidiaries. While tort and trade creditors are typically creditors of only one legal entity
with
such structures, there will often be a tax liability-sharing agreement among the entities within the
firm, and financial creditors typically receive cross-guaranties from most domestic entities within
the firm structure. In some situations, there will be multiple debtor entities with the same
creditors, but these creditor entities may not have equal interests in all of the debtors.
123. This situation existed in telecommunications company Adelphia's bankruptcy. There
were 230 affiliated debtor entities with some overlapping creditors. ACC Bondholder Grp. v.
Adelphia Commc'ns Corp. (In re Adelphia Comm'cns Corp.), 36 1 B.R. 337, 341-42 (S.D.N.Y.
2007). Five groups of creditors were deputized to litigate various intercompany claims, fraudulent
transfer actions, and other inter-debtor causes of action. Id. at 343-45. Four of the creditor
groups negotiated a settlement at the expense of the other creditor group (the "ACC Bondholder
Group"), which objected to the settlement. Id. The ACC Bondholder Group was not unified,
however-some of its members purportedly had claims against other debtor entities and so were
in favor of the settlement because on net they did better. See id. at 364-67. But see In reAdelphia
Comm'cns Corp., 368 B.R. 140, 222 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007).
I 24. See Ion Media Networks, Inc. v. Cyrus Select Opportunities Master Fund, Ltd. (In re Ion
Media Networks, Inc.), 419 B.R. 585, 588-89 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (noting that a distressed
debt investor's "motivations are easy enough to recognize. It has been using aggressive
bankruptcy litigation tactics as a means to gain negotiating leverage or obtainjudicial rulings
that
will enable it to earn outsize returns on its bargain basement debt purchases . . . .").
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compared to solvent firms), and, because debt is often trading at a
considerable discount, these blocking positions can be purchased on the
cheap. With regard to transparency, the existing regime for disclosing
creditor's potential control positions is rudimentary at best. As a result, when
a control position is combined with an undisclosed short, the creditor
becomes a Trojan Horse creditor.125

1.

Current Mechanisms

Concern about use of leverage to reallocate value is not new, and we will
discuss the Code's response in more detail below. Disputes have arisen about
whether secured creditors' deficiency claims can be classified together with
6
other unsecured creditors 2 and whether an (under)secured creditor can sit
on an unsecured creditors' committee.127 Indeed, the Bankruptcy Code

already recognizes the problem and provides for it in two contexts.
First, the Code regulates the retention of professionals by the bankruptcy
estate. Professionals, such as attorneys, who assist in the governance of the
debtor during the bankruptcy, can be retained only if they are "disinterested"
5
and "do not hold or represent an interest adverse to the estate."'= Thus, to
the extent that a professional is itself a creditor or equity holder, the retention
is prohibited, 29 and if a professional had a material financial position in a
competitor of the debtors, that would also preclude retention. Likewise, if the
professional had previously served as an officer or director of the debtor,
retention is forbiddenl3o-the estate might well have claims against the
professional on account of that prior service, and the professional would be
conflicted in counseling the estate about prosecution of such a claim. The
disinterestedness requirement for professionals is designed to ensure that
those parties who assist in the governance of the estate are not exercising their
influence for their personal benefit at the expense of the estate.
See supra text accompanying notes 29-30.
D. Alaska
See, e.g., In re Marlow Manor Downtown, LLC, 499 B.R. 717, 720-21 (Bankr.
Marlow Manor Downtown,
20 3), aff'd, Marlow Manor Downtown, LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank (In re
LLC), No. AK-1 4 -1122-JuKiKu, 2015 WL 667543, at *g-io (B.A.P. 9 th Cir. Feb. 6, 2015)
Post Rd.
(holding separate classification of unsecured deficiency claim improper); see also Boston
(holding
1994)
Cir.
(2d
483
477,
d
F.
2
1
P'ship),
Ltd.
Rd.
Post
Boston
re
(In
FDIC
v.
3
P'ship
Ltd.
separate classification of unsecured deficiency claim from unsecured trade claims improper);
Travelers Ins. Co. v. Bryson Props., XVIII (In re Bryson Props., XVIII), 961 F.2d 496, 502 ( 4 th
Cir. 1992); Phoenix Mut Life Ins. Co. v. Greystone III Joint Venture (In re Greystone III Joint
Venture), 995 F.2d 1274, 1280-81 ( 5 th Cir. 1991); In re 18 RVC, LLC, 485 B.R. 492,497 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 2012); In re SM 104 Ltd., 16o B.R. 202, 220 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1993); In reBjolmes Realty
Tr., 134 B.R. 1ooo, 1003 (Bankr. D. Mass. 199 1); In reAztec Co., 107 B.R. 585> 587 (Bankr. M.D.
125.

126.

Tenn. 1989).
See, e.g., In reWalat Farms, Inc., 64 B.R. 65, 70 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1986); In re Glendale
127.
Woods Apartments, Ltd., 25 B.R- 414,415 (Bankr. D. Md. 1982).
11 U.S.C. §§ 101(14), 327(a) (2012).
128.
Id.§ 101( 4 )(A).
129.
130. Id. § 1o1(14) (B).
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Second, concerns about conflicted creditors are reflected in the context
of the Code's overlooked "Lesser Vote"-the vote for the election of a Chapter
7 trustee. 3' The only moment when creditors exert governance influence in
Chapter 7 is when they vote to elect the Chapter 7 trustee. The Bankruptcy
Code provides that a creditor may vote for a candidate for trustee only if the
creditor "does not have an interest materially adverse, other than an equity
interest that is not substantial in relation to such creditor's interest as a
creditor, to the interest of creditors entitled to such distribution" and "is not
an insider."132 No such provision exists in Chapter ii, where there is
not

normally a trustee appointed and where equity holders and insiders are not
automatically disqualified from all voting.'33
The advent of robust trading in claims and the increased sophistication
of credit derivatives warrants a reexamination of the assumption that there
are sufficient mechanisms available under current law to police conflicts of
interest and to insure equitable distribution of a firm's value. That
assumption, for the reasons we discuss above, is untenable in the face of
modern capital markets.'34 It is now necessary to consider how bankruptcy law
might ensure the alignment of a creditor's economic rights and control rights
in the present environment.
2.

Fragmentation Concerns

First, we should elaborate on the fragmentation and transparency
problems created by the separation of economic interest from governance
rights (or to put it the other way around, by the linking of a conflict of interest
to governance rights). As Michael Heller has pointed out, fragmentation
problems arise when the proliferation of veto rights makes it impossible for
common owners to cooperate towards a mutually beneficial outcome.'35 An

economic "short" may seek to sabotage a workout and encourage a
bankruptcy to trigger payment on a derivative that is contingent on a

131.
132.

133.

Id. § 702.
Id. § 702 (a) (2)-(3).
Chapter 11 disqualifies insiders from one of its two votes. While insiders' votes count

for purposes of

134.
135.

iI

129(a) (8), they do not count for

§

1129(a) (1o).

See supra Sections II.E. 2-3.

Michael A. Heller, The BoundariesofPrivate Property, I08 YALE L.J. i 163, 1t86-87 (1999);

Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transitionfrom
Marx to Markets,
III HARV. L. REv. 621, 68o (1998) [hereinafter Heller, The Tragedy
of the Anticommons].

Fragmentation also interacts with transparency. Compare Thomas W. Merrill
& Henry E. Smith,
OptimalStandardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus
Clausus Princip, 1 10 YALE L.J. 1, 3-7
(2000) (arguing that because property rights affect the rights of third parties, transparency
is
essential, and therefore, complex and divided forms of property should be discouraged),
with
Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Property, Contract, and Verification:
The Numerus Clausus
Problem and the Divisibility of Rights, 31 J. LEG. STUD. S373, S374-75 (2002)
(asserting that the

problem of division and transparency can be remedied through verification systems).
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6
bankruptcy filing or other default.'3 Similarly, a claimant with a short
to force
position may seek to block confirmation of a bankruptcy plan in order
disrupt
may
that
ways
in
liquidation, or may be willing to bargain aggressively
economic
inverted
or
hedged
its
the administration of the case due to
interest.s7 The "short" thus benefits from the misfortune of the debtor.
When governance rights in bankruptcy trade at a discount, it becomes
cheaper for a short to become a Trojan Horse and bring about the misfortune
it desires. As such, the ability to separate economic interest from governance
workout
rights can create or exacerbate coordination problems at both the
8
thus,
can,
liquidity
much
Too
stage and at the plan confirmation stage.'3
Where
"anticommons."139
the
and
create tragedies of both the "commons"
the right to use an asset is held in common, claimants trying to grab too large
the
a share can lead to destruction of an existing asset. This is a tragedy of
case
this
asset-in
"commons." Where creation or preservation of a common
a firm's reorganization or going concern value-is subject to multiple or fluid
"veto rights," such as claimants drifting in and out of blocking positions, the
result can be to frustrate the coordination necessary to create a common
benefit. This is the tragedy of the "anticommons." As we will discuss below,
this is particularly problematic in bankruptcy, where, by design, the Code
over the
gives a variety of claimants legal and practical veto rights
solvent,
is
company
a
reorganization-considerably more than exist when
of
outside
have
though also somewhat less than that claimant might
bankruptcy against an insolvent firm.140
Coordination problems can emerge naturally as a product of the liquidity
of claims. For example, a debtor may work out a deal with one key creditor,
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See supratext accompanying notes 59-65. In theory there
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prepetition
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employees. Their interest in the debtor is not limited
but is likely driven by their hope of getting future business from the debtor.
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of
own both the equity
the debtor
investor might be happy for the debtor to assume excessive risk in order to keep
key supplier of a firm in
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operating in order
debtor
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keep
to
which the investor is also invested, the investor might want
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this
address
not
do
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other
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issues at the plan confirmation
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stage). See generally Baird & Rasmussen,
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See Complaint, supranote 61,
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See generally Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the
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only to have that creditor sell its claim to a new party. Where the purchaser of
the claim is a Schadenfreude investor-an economic short-the purchaser's
goal may be to obstruct any agreement. The debtor and other creditors have
no way of knowing this or of remedying the informational problem prior to
bankruptcy and, under current law, even in bankruptcy. i Alternatively, the
claims may find themselves in the hands of a holdout, willing to destroy the
debtor to leverage a larger share of the pie. Worse yet, false signaling and
coordination problems may interact and reinforce each other. For example,
while the liquidity of claims is generally thought to improve the amount of
information in the case, by setting a value for the debt,i2 it may be being used
to accumulate a control position on behalf of a short.
3.

Transparency Concerns

A second broad concern is false signaling (i.e., transparency). Concealed
or disguised short positions impose informational costs on other investors. To
participate in a bankruptcy, stakeholders are only required to disclose their
"claim" or "interest," not what they paid for it, and not whether
they have
engaged in any hedging behavior. Therefore, it is difficult for other claimants
to evaluate whether, for example, an unsecured creditor's behavior is driven
by their interest in maximizing their economic interest as an unsecured
creditor, or for some other reason.
This false signaling is particularly troublesome in bankruptcy cases.
Bankruptcy law recognizes that it may not be rational for an individual
unsecured creditor to put much effort into monitoring a case. The gains from
monitoring or otherwise participating will be shared pro rata with all
unsecured creditors, but the costs of monitoring are borne by the individual
monitoring creditor. The hope in bankruptcy law is that the smaller creditors
will free ride on the information provided by the behavior of larger creditors.
Thus, the Bankruptcy Code provides for an official committee or committees
of unsecured creditors funded by the bankruptcy estate.13 The idea is that
the larger, more sophisticated creditors will serve on these committees and
that the smaller creditors will piggyback on their efforts. The committee
members are made whole, because the direct pecuniary costs of committee
service are paid by the estate.14s Because official committee members serve in

141. Creditors will sometimes use both pre- and post-petition restructuring support
agreements (also known as lock-up agreements) to attempt to bind themselves and others to
supporting plans that meet particular characteristics, see Edward J. Janger & Adam J. Levitin,
Badges of Opportunism: PrincipesforPolicingResuturingSupport Ageemnts, 13 BROOK.J. CORP.
FIN.
& COMM. L. (forthcoming 2019), but these devices do not ensure that parties to the agreements
are in fact long or that they do not subsequently acquire short positions.
142. Douglas G. Baird, The Bankruptcy Exchange, 4 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 23,
26-27 (2009).
143.

11

144.

Seeid.§H

U.S.C.

§ 1102 (2012).
0, 1103.
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a representative capacity, however, they are subject to fiduciary duties that
limit their right to engage in self-interested behavior.45 Fiduciary duties,
however, are an imperfect protection against false signaling because they are
less than crystalline and are imperfectly enforced. 46 Moreover, not all
signaling is done by committee members. Small creditors may choose simply
to follow the lead of creditors with larger positions that are not committee
members (perhaps because they do not wish to be subject to trading
restrictions).
In short, the purchase of a control position or a combination of control
and blocking positions creates the power to obstruct, which may be reinforced
by the lack of transparency. Also of significance, these "control" positions may
have financial value that is separate and distinct from the distributional rights
they represent. If control rights can be traded separately from economic
rights, the ability of certain claimants to realize value on the control premium
raises serious concerns about the "equitable distribution of [a] firm['s]
value."'.7

G.

DISTRESSED DEBT TRADING AND GOVERNANCE

It is now commonly understood, even by non-specialists, that debt of
insolvent and bankrupt firms continues to trade, even after the debtor has
filed for bankruptcy. This is not an unusual feature of bankruptcy regimes,
but the governance effects (as distinct from the distributional effects) are
more dramatic in the United States, where there is generally no formal
fiduciary or administrator charged with administering the debtor, and the
5
estate is overseen by a debtor-in-possession.4 There is a significant market
for "distressed debt."149 Some of the investors in this market (sometimes
derided as "vulture funds") are merely making a prediction about the likely
return on the firm's debts.'5o Others, however, may be investing in a
"governance play."'s' As we have discussed above, debt traders are not
they are privy to substantial
145. Committee members are also subject to trading bars because
the Trading Wall:
Undermining
Note,
Enayati,
P.
Robert
debtor.
the
about
non-public information

The BAPCPA's Affront on the Creditors' Committee's Duty of Confidentiality in Chapter iz Bankruptcies,
21 GEO.J.LEGALETHICS 703, 7o6 (2008).
Insolvency, in THE OXFORD
146. John A. E. Pottow, Fiduciary Duties in Bankruptcy and
Apr. 2019). See also
forthcoming
eds.,
al.
et
Criddle
J.
HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAw (Evan
generally Henry T.C. Hu & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Abolition of the CorporateDuty to Creditors, 107

in
COLUM. L. REV. 1321 (2007) (proposing an alternative doctrine in which a corporation
bankruptcy would not owe a higher duty to creditors than shareholders).
147.

SeeJacoby &Janger, TracingEquity, supranote 4, at 679.
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148. See LEVITIN, supra note 39, at 358-59 (noting that "[i]n
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United
the
outside
possession' (DIP)" and that "[imn many countries
setting for all insolvencies").

151.

ONE DOLLAR, ONE VOTE

2o0g]

1889

necessarily investing purely in economic return. They might be seeking to
purchase the company (sometimes called a "loan-to-own" investor); for
insolvent firms, debt markets are part of the market for corporate control.
It is also common for the price of a company's stock to change, and with
it, the price of purchasing control over a firm. Corporate raiders look for
bargains. When a stock's price falls, it may make a firm a takeover target
because the control rights can be purchased at a relatively cheaper price. As
we have shown, however, the motives may not be so benign. The investor
might be the owner of a competitor, or might in some other way be an
economic short. 52
These aspects of the market for corporate control do not distinguish
distressed debt markets from equity markets (though the fact that debt is in
bankruptcy shifts the locus of regulation from securities regulation and state
corporate law to federal bankruptcy law). Control rights trade at a premium,
and all of these phenomena (including empty voting) exist in equity markets
and are relatively unregulated.53

In this section, we challenge the understanding that trading of
governance rights after insolvency, and particularly after filing for
bankruptcy, requires no more regulation than trading in equities outside of
bankruptcy. In our view, there are additional dynamics and policies that come
into play on the event horizon where fixed claims without governance rights
(debt) turn, effectively, into variable claims with governance rights (stock).
The practicalities of this transformation are not well understood, and its
implications are not adequately theorized. In this section, we sketch out some
important differences. First, the fact that debt trades at a discount may create
bargain price control blocks, but more importantly, bankruptcy-specific
aspects of the plan confirmation process multiply the number of such
"bargain blocking positions," and mandate different legal treatment of
governance rights in bankruptcy.
1.

The Event-Horizon-Insolvency

A key difference between the governance of a firm in bankruptcy and
governance of a solvent company is that bankruptcy governance straddles an
indistinct but nonetheless crucial event horizon-insolvency. When a debtor
enters the zone of insolvency, debt begins to act like stock. Fixed claimants
become variable claimants, and the former owners of a firm are potentially
playing with other people's money. This is a financial, rather than a legal
"event horizon." Financial markets deal with the possibility
that this might
happen in a variety of ways-by discounting the price of debt securities,
increasing interest rates, and, as mentioned above, selling credit derivatives.

152.

Id. 95-96.
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But when the risk of insolvency becomes the fact of insolvency, there are legal
consequences as well. This adds considerable complexity to distress situations,
and it is important not to oversimplify.
Different legal regimes deal with this event horizon in different ways.
Most countries force the immediate legal recognition of insolvency, and
trigger the immediate financial realization on the value of the firm. For
example, in the United Kingdom, the law of wrongful trading imposes
additional duties in the zone of insolvency, and may require the debtor to
commence insolvency proceedings upon financial insolvency. s4 Civil law
jurisdictions impose criminal liability on officers and directors if they do not
commence insolvency proceedings in a timely fashion.ss This keeps things
simple. Upon commencing insolvency proceedings in virtually every other
jurisdiction outside the United States, governance is lodged in a fiduciary, and
in many (though not all) of those jurisdictions, the job of the fiduciary is to
liquidate the firm.

56

This is not the rule in the United States. S7 There is no requirement that
an insolvent firm commence a bankruptcy proceeding, nor is a bankruptcy
8
proceeding predicated on a finding of insolvency. 5 Even once a proceeding
is opened in the United States, Chapter 1i1 is designed to allow for the delay
of financial realization of the firm's value. Nonetheless, there is a congeries
of legal doctrines under U.S. law that confirm that the nature of the
debtor/creditor relation changes upon insolvency.'59 Because realization of
value is delayed, however, the governance situation is considerably muddied.
As we have discussed above,,6o the filing of bankruptcy expressly transfers
governance power to creditors. This means that, at least in the United States,
financial insolvency creates an expectation, even before a debtor files for
bankruptcy, that when one purchases debt one is purchasing an ownership
interest. Dollars become shares of ownership. Indeed, one may even be
purchasing debt with the goal of becoming the owner of the firm, and/or with
the expectation of exercising the attendant governance rights in the event of
a bankruptcy filing.
1582] (Eng.).
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At first glance, this may seem unremarkable. The genius of markets is
that once control rights shift from one class of securities to another it should
be reflected in market prices. But it's not that simple. Control does not work
the same way in bankruptcy as it does outside. The legal governance regime
shifts upon filing of a bankruptcy petition, where corporate law voting rules
are replaced by the plan confirmation process and by the practical dynamics
of a Chapter i
2.

i case.

Control Mechanisms in Insolvency and Bankruptcy

Perversely, creditors in bankruptcy may have more powerful governance
rights than shareholders. Classification of claims and voting rules create
multiple opportunities to create blocking positions. Even secured creditors
(still fixed claimants with respect to their collateral) can exercise a limited
veto.'6' Furthermore, a variety of additional policy concerns come into play in
the vicinity of insolvency-shifting fiduciary duties, distorted valuations,
concerns about equality of distribution and hence value allocation, and
concerns about the timing of realization of various rights. In this section, we
give those concerns additional consideration and suggest that they may
require a rethinking of the allocation of governance rights in bankruptcy.
The transition for creditors from passive investors to claimants with
control rights begins before the filing of bankruptcy. Upon default (either of
payment or through a covenant default), creditors get the right to pull the
plug on the debtors' operations. This power is actually more extreme than
the shareholder's right to vote on important corporate decisions. The
unsecured creditor can seek a judgment. Any steps to execute on that
judgment, by levying, or recording the lien against real property starts a goday preference avoidance clock. 6 2 This lights the bankruptcy fuse, so to
speak. Creditors can join in filing an involuntary bankruptcy petition,' 63 and
secured creditors can commence self-help repossession and foreclosure.
Outside of bankruptcy, almost everybody has a veto power over a consensual
workout or restructuring; holdout and other coordination problems
abound.' 64 In the absence of Chapter i 1, insolvency triggers a winding up and
realization for creditors.

161.

This point is not immediately obvious. Why would creditors get greater governance

rights in bankruptcy than a shareholder would outside of bankruptcy?
The reasons are
complicated. But the key point is that outside of bankruptcy, the creditor has the
right to insist
on payment in full. That ability to insist on payment in full creates a holdout
veto that bankruptcy
seeks to manage-not through majority voting of shares, but through class
voting, which works

differently.

i62.
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Chapter 1i limits these draconian rights in order to preserve value
through a collective solution. Practical power is traded for more formal, but
In
equally important, governance rights. The quid pro quo is complicated.
given
are
creditors
return for limitation on their non-bankruptcy veto rights,
an assurance of a baseline entitlement (best interests and cramdown) and of
6
to
equitable/equal treatment. 5 As such, the governance rights accorded
creditors should be tailored to accomplish these goals.
Creditors' governance rights in bankruptcy are, nonetheless,
considerably greater than the relatively modest powers of shareholders to vote
on directors and to approve extraordinary corporate transactions. Once the
debtor is in bankruptcy, unsecured creditors have the power to object to non6
6
ordinary course transactions, and to vote on the plan, 7 and they may be
able to obtain a blocking position depending on classification.
Voting rights in bankruptcy are not as simple as shareholder rights.
68
Bankruptcy voting is by class,, and creditors are separately classified for a
6
variety of reasons. 9 Only classes whose claims are impaired get to vote, and
in all
plan confirmation requires an affirmative vote by dual majorities either
(in
votes
insider
excluding
class
impaired classes or in at least one impaired
restrictions).7o
substantive
additional
which case the plan is then subject to
For an impaired class of creditors to accept a plan requires acceptance of the
least
plan by over one-half of the number of claims in the class and at
two-thirds of the dollar amount of the claims in the class.17'
In other words, control of a class for acceptance requires a higher
threshold than at corporate law (generally a simple majority of shares).
Conversely, blocking is easier: achieving a one-third (plus $i) interest in
terms of face amount in a class of claims (or one-half in number of claims)
confers a limited right to block a plan. 72 The fact that blocking a plan
requires a lower threshold of control than accepting a plan is particularly
important given that creditors who are net short of a debtor are likely to want
to block a plan. Outside of limited statutory requirements, the debtor initially
has the exclusive right to propose a plan,7'3 so a short is unlikely to push for
plan acceptance, at least initially.

(asserting
in U.S.C. § 7 26(b) (denoting pro rata distribution within class); id. § 1122
165.
treatment
that classes must contain only similar creditors); id. § 1123(a) (4) (providing for equal
the
within classes); id. § 129(a) (7) (applying the best interests test); id. § 1s2 9 (b) (asserting
"fair and equitable" requirement of cramdown).
166. Id. § 3 6 3 (b) ().
167. Id. § 1 126.
168. Id. § 126(c)-(d).
169.

170.
171.
172.

173.

Id.

§ 1 122

(providing classification standards).

Id.§§ I 126(f), 1129(a)(8), 1129(a) (to), Ia 9 (b).
Id. § 1i26(c).
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Id. § 1121 (b)-(c).
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Secured creditors may not foreclose immediately when the bankruptcy is
filed, but they may be able to lift the automatic stay and subsequently
foreclose.'74 They may also be able to assert control over the debtor's cash
through negotiations over the use of cash collateral, and the ability to block
post-petition financing.'75 Similarly, they too have a limited right to block a
plan through voting if impaired. 76
The Bankruptcy Code trades a creditor's practical veto and exit rights for
a voice on how to realize value-that is, in the firm's governance. In doing so,
they create myriad ways in which a creditor can obstruct a plan. Most of these
are by design. In many cases, however, these blocking positions can create
anticommons and other coordination problems. Worse yet, modern claims
trading markets may fundamentally alter the landscape, particularly when
linked to derivatives.
3.

Insolvency, Claims Trading and the Control Premium

Claims against insolvent entities trade at a discount from face amount.
This makes sense given the reduced probability of a return. But, as noted
above, they can still carry with them a control premium. Part of the value of
the claim lies in the entitlement to a distribution that it represents, but when
linked to a control position, part of the value lies in the ability to steer the
case, or hold it hostage. This power may allow the claimant to demand a
premium as part of its distribution, use its leverage to benefit its position in
another class, or capitalize on a short position. 77
As the price of debt changes, so does the price of control. This is not
intrinsically problematic. In equity markets, for example, changes in the price
of stock do not change the governance rights associated with that share. As a
result, the cost of gaining control rises and falls with the price of the stock. As
we have noted above, governance and veto rights function differently in
bankruptcy. Obstruction is easier, sometimes by design, sometimes not.'7 8 It
therefore merits consideration whether the power to block a plan ought to be
limited when claims are purchased at a steep discount.
First, where debt is trading at a steep discount, control rights or veto
rights may be purchased on the cheap. This is problematic in the first instance
because it may make it too easy to purchase "holdout" power. This holdout
power can be used by the claims purchaser to seek to extort a
disproportionate amount of the value of the firm from other creditors. Worse
yet, when linked to the ability to create "empty" or short positions linked to
control, the result may not just be reallocation of value, but its destruction.
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These differences between solvent companies and firms in bankruptcy are, in
our view, sufficient to justify consideration of a bankruptcy specific approach
to conflicts of interest, holdouts, and specifically, Trojan Horse creditors.
But there's more; claims trading allows for the trading of veto rights, and
hence the power to hold out. Vetoes have value, and make some votes more
valuable than others when traded. This, in and of itself, implicates the
Bankruptcy Code's principle of equal treatment. Control rights are a
mechanism for firm governance, not an asset of a particular creditor. If
anything, they are an asset of the class of creditors. But, by definition, control
rights cannot be traded equally, as they reflect a power to veto or bind an
action desired by other members of the same class. We develop this
complication in the next section.
III.

CLAIMs TRADING-EQUAL TREATMENT, REALIZATION, AND

GOVERNANCE RIGHTS

Because claims trading enables a market in control rights in bankruptcy,
the filing of a bankruptcy petition produces a governance problem that
for similar
bumps into the fundamental bankruptcy policy of equal treatment
by claims
caused
distortion
governance
creditors. This is a second and distinct
trading.
A.

EQUAL TREATMENT

In a recent article, TracingEquity: Realizing and Allocating Value in Chapter

iI, one of us (anger) and Melissa jacoby explored at length the meaning of
the term "equity," as used in state law and in the Bankruptcy Code.79 We
explained that the filing of a bankruptcy petition operates as a form of
"realization." so Liquidation in bankruptcy operates as a realization of value,
and distribution according to the legal status of the claimants on the petition
date. The genius of Chapter ii is that it allows realization of the firm's value
to be delayed, where doing so is in the best interest of the estate. However,
the quid pro quo is that the principle of equal treatment will be respected,
and it is, thus, a basic principle of bankruptcy that similarly treated creditors
should be treated similarly.1' However Chapter i1 creates a problem.
in the
Reorganization over time does not necessarily affect all types of claims
the
during
value
in
same way. Encumbered assets may increase or decrease
or
operations
through
case, or be sold. The value of the firm may increase,
to
how
obvious
asset appreciation, or it may decline. It is, therefore, not
manage the principle of equal treatment over time.

equity in bankruptcy law).
SeegeneralyJacoby&Janger, TracingEquiy, suranote 4 (discussing
179.
i8o. See id. at 682-709.
18i. See 1' U.S.C. § 7 26(b) (requiring pro rata treatment for creditors of similar priority);
id. § 1122 (explaining that only similar claims may be classified together); id. § i123(a) (4)
unfair
(requiring equal treatment for all claims in a class); id. § 112 9 (b) (prohibiting
discrimination in cramdown).
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In TracingEquity, Jacoby and Janger explain that the Code gives effect to
equal treatment over time by splitting the process of "realization" in two
-fixing the relative position of claimants on the petition date ("Equitable
Realization"), but determining the value of those claims at a variety of later
dates ("Value Realization")., The Bankruptcy Code treats the filing of the
bankruptcy petition as an "equitable realization"; the baseline for equal
treatment is established on the date of the bankruptcy petition. For unsecured
creditors, the relative pro-rata position of claims as of the petition date is
enforced through the disallowance of claims for unmatured interest. 83
Similarly, the relative positions of asset-based (secured) claimants and
unsecured claimants with regard to firm value are fixed on the petition date
through the discontinuation of floating liens and equitable limitations placed
on a secured creditors' interest in proceeds. 84 Thus, increases in firm value
attributable to operations are distributed pro rata among the unsecured
creditors, while asset based priority claims are tied to assets owned on the
petition date. For secured creditors, this means that the pool of encumbered
assets (collateral) is fixed on the petition date, as is the value of those assets.
That value is entitled to adequate protection, for downside purposes, but any
appreciation is measured at the time the asset is actually sold, or upon the
effective date of the plan, whichever is earlier. In other words, for a secured
creditor, their allowed secured claim is realized for downside purposes on the
petition date, but for upside purposes, upon disposition of the asset.
8

i85

B.

CONTROL, COLLA

TERAL

AND EQUAL TREATMENT: TCREDIT BIDDING

PROBLEM OF

Up until now, we have been looking at situations where a claims trader
attempts to purchase the "fulcrum" security to gain governance rights. The
idea of the fulcrum security is a corporate governance principle based in
corporate finance. The idea is that the junior-most class of claims that is "in
the money" (that is to say, eligible for a distribution) should control the firm's
governance because it is the residual claimant. Increases in value redound to
its benefit, and declines in value occur at its expense. Bankruptcy law
generally respects this view, and as a result, the focus of our governance
concern has been on the purchase ofjunior debt claims.
There is another claims trading context that implicates the equality of
distribution. Secured credit is both more and less powerful as a governance
device. On the one hand, the secured creditor receives a distributional
priority with regard to the value of its collateral in the form of an allowed

182.

183.

Jacoby &Janger, TracingEquity, supra note 4, at 688,
694.
11 U.S.C. § 5 02(b) (2).

184. Id. § 552(a) (explaining the discontinuation of floating liens); id. § 5 5 2(b) (discussing
the effect of a security interest postpetition); seejacoby &Janger, TracingEquity, supranote
4, at 706.
185. SeeJacoby &Janger, TracingEquity, supranote 4, at 688.
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secured claim. As a result, the secured claim is usually separately classified,
and therefore votes in its own class. In addition to having the right to vote its
claim as a member of a class, however, it also has governance rights that arise
as a result of its lien on particular assets. In particular, if the assets are being
the Code, the secured
sold as part of the plan or in a sale under Section 363 of
86
creditor generally has the right to credit bid its claim, meaning that secured
creditor can offset its claim against its bid in a 363 sale, effectively making the
right to credit bid
secured creditor's debt the price to beat at the sale. 87 The
88
but courts have
was recently reaffirmed by the Supreme Court,'
that mirrors our
way
a
in
right
that
of
limits
subsequently explored the
concerns.'89

The problem arises when an undersecured creditor who does not have a
lien on all of the assets of the debtor seeks to credit bid at a going concern
sale of substantially all of the debtor's assets. If the gap between the value of
the assets and the amount of the secured creditor's debt is large enough, the
credit bid may allow the secured party to purchase the firm at a substantial
discount.
To illustrate, suppose that a secured creditor has a lien on many, but not
all of the debtor's assets. Those assets are worth $1o million, if liquidated by
themselves, and secure a $16 million debt. The debtor's other assets, not
If the
subject to the lien, are worth $2 million if liquidated by themselves.
million.
$15
worth
be
debtor were sold as a going concern, however, it would
In this case, should the secured creditor be allowed to credit bid for $16
million (the face amount of its debt), or merely $io million (the realizable
value of its collateral)?19o If the secured creditor can credit bid $16 million, it
will win the auction because no other party would rationally bid higher than
creditor to
$15 million. The result, then, would be to allow the undersecured
value of
realizable
(the
collateral
its
capture $5 million of value not tied to
value)
sale
going-concern
unencumbered assets plus the bankruptcy-created
and to which it has no priority entitlement.

186.

i 1 U.S.C. § 3 6 3 (k). Credit bidding may be restricted "for cause." Id.

different than credit
We note here that credit bidding in bankruptcy is technically
187.
bidding in a state law foreclosure. State law foreclosure sales will by definition be of only a
a
creditor's collateral, not other non-collateral assets. LEVITIN, sufra note 39, at 42. In contrast,
bankruptcy sale may include assets that extend beyond a creditor's collateral package.
RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 566 U.S. 639, 649 (2012).
188.
agreements, which are
189. We also note the possibility of debtor in possession financing
lender's right to credit
DIP
the
requiring
approved by court order, II U.S.C. § 364, contractually
against public policy.
as
void
be
should
limitation
contractual
a
such
believe
We
bid be preserved.
See id. § 3 64 (a)-(f).
igo. The language of § 3 6 3 (k) does not definitely resolve this issue because it refers to
of "such claim",
property that is subject to a lien that secures an "allowed claim" and the offset
entire allowed
the
or
claim
secured
allowed
the
isjust
without clarifying if this the claim referenced
collateral
claim, particularly if there has not been a determination of the value of the creditor's
yet. See id. § 3 6 3 (k).
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This concern is not theoretical. In Free Lance-Star, a potential buyer of the
debtor, a newspaper, purchased the senior lenders claim, including its
liens.19, The goal of the claim purchaser was to use its ownership of the
secured debt to exercise control over the bankruptcy and to use the right to
credit bid to purchase the company in a 363 sale.192 How the court remedied
this problem will be discussed below.
C.

CLAIMS, THE CONTROL PREMIUM, AND EQUAL TREMEA

-rr

The lesson of this Article, so far, is that control positions, created by liens,
as above, or by owning a blocking (one-third of a class) or accepting (twothirds of a class), have value. A claims purchaser will pay extra for a block of
claims that come with the power to influence the case-to become a bully or
a Trojan Horse. But a question remains. How should the value of a control
premium be allocated? In the previous sections, we established that those
rights should not be exercisable on behalf of someone whose interest conflicts
with the estate or members of the claimant's class.'93 But even when the
interest of the holder aligns with the estate, how should the value of "control"
be distributed to members of the relevant class?
Before one can answer, one must first distinguish pure "economic exit"
from a sale where part of the price includes a "control premium." There is
really no basis for objecting to pure economic exit. If an investor thinks that
a claim, or the debtor, is undervalued, basic market principles suggest that
selling the claim should be allowed. By contrast, the reasons are not so strong
where the price of a claim includes a control premium. In order to see why, it
is helpful to list the various reasons that "control" might have value, over and
above the economic value of a claim. We can identify the following reasons:
*
Claimants might hold an interest elsewhere in the capital
structure and wish to maximize the value of that claim at the
expense of the holders of claimants in a particular class.
*

Claimants might wish to capture value of an asset synergy,
for example an adjoining landowner wishing to put together
an assemblage, or a related firm looking to increase market
share.

*

Claimants might have a legitimate disagreement about how
best to maximize the value of the debtor or the distribution
to the class.

The first motivation, based on our previous discussion, is aimed directly
at violating equality of distribution as these Claimants increase their
distribution at the expense of the rest of the class or another class. The second
In re Free Lance-Star Publ'g Co. of Fredericksburg, 512 B.R. 798,
See supra text accompanying notes 186-87.

193.

See supra Sections II.C-.E, ILF. i, IIG.3

-

192.

191.

Soo

(Ban kr. E.D. Va. 2014).
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rationale is more ambiguous. The asset synergy has positive value, but the
control premium would allow the owner of the synergy to use its governance
rights in the debtor to capture that value at the expense of the estate (and
other creditors). In other words, both of these reasons for exiting are
candidates for limitation of governance rights, either through separate
classification or limitation of voting rights.
Only the third rationale reflects an honest disagreement about how to
maximize the distribution to the class. For this limited class of situations alone,
there is not a concern about equality of distribution. The question then
becomes how to distinguish such honest disagreements from hold-out
behavior. In our view, the best way to solve both of these problems is by
how
preventing the sale of control rights at the time of exit. We will explain
this is done below.
D.

THE PRiE oF TiE CONTRoL PREMIUM AND EQUAL TREATMENT

Even for claims purchases in the third category-honest disagreement
about how to maximize value-the principle of equal treatment is implicated.
During the course of a case, the price of debt may change-and so will the
price of the control premium.
At first glance that would not appear to be problematic. In equity
markets, for example, the market for corporate control relies on the fact that
share valuation will determine when takeovers will, happen. Similarly, if we are
willing to tolerate economic exit, then the changing price of the debt will
affect the distribution that selling creditors get depending on the time they
exit. But, where a control premium is involved, there is a different problem.
The opportunity to capture the premium is not available to the entire class,
and again, if the price changes over time, the relative distributions will
change.
Moreover, the control premium is not evenly distributed across all class
members. The holders of the first one-third (plus $1) of the amount of a class
of debt to tender their claims can "sell" a blocking position." So can the
holders of the second one-third (plus $1), albeit to someone else. The holders
of the remaining one-third (minus $2) are left out in the cold. Conversely,
the holders of two-thirds of the amount of a class of debt have the ability to
sell the power to "accept." The remaining one-third are, again, left out in the
cold, with no ability to block a plan through the vote.
This ability to distribute the value of a control premium unequally also
violates the principle of equal treatment and allows one subset of the
claimants to extract value from another. This potential inequality manifests
upon insolvency. While there is no general legal commitment to equal
treatment outside of bankruptcy, it is a baseline distributional principle that
equality of treatment is measured as of bankruptcy day once the debtor
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files. 94 The relative position of creditors should not change. The ability of a
first mover to grab that premium at the expense of other similar creditors
violates the principle of equal treatment. As bankruptcy law polices even prebankruptcy grabs by first movers, 95 afortioriitdoes not brook post-bankruptcy
grabs.
In sum, we are concerned that the trading of claims at a discount after
insolvency can cause problems in two ways. First, it facilitates the
accumulation of control and blocking positions that might be linked to shorts,
resulting in Schadenfreude creditors becoming "bullies," and worse yet, Trojan
Horse creditors.'9 6 Second, because this power can be traded separately from
a claim's distributional rights, it allows for the reallocation of the control
premium among similarly situated creditors after the case has been filed. As
we will discuss below, while these two concerns are distinct, they can be
remedied by a single family of remedies that we call, collectively, "mark-tomarket" governance. 97 In the next two sections, we will describe the existing
mechanisms for dealing with distorted governance incentives and show why
they are inadequate. Then we will describe our preferred approach.
IV.

EXISTING REMEDIES AND THEIR LIMITATIONS

To the extent that conflicts of interest and governance distortions caused
by claims trading are to be solved by law, there are a number of possible
approaches that might be tried in various contexts, individually, or in
combination. They are: (i) mandating disclosure; (2) limiting the voting
power of creditors to correct the mismatch between voting power and
economic interest; (3) limiting the alienability of claims; and (4) limiting the
creditors' distribution through subordination or disallowance. Each of these
remedies is available to some extent within the Bankruptcy Code as currently
written. Each also has certain limitations and possible unintended
consequences. In this section, we address each separately.

A.

DISCLOSURE

One proposed method for dealing with distorted governance incentives
would be mandatory disclosure of economic interests.,9 8 Mandatory
disclosure of hedges is the method currently used for addressing distorted

194.
195.

See ] U.S.C. §§ 726(b), 1129(a) (7).
Id. § 547 (allowing for the "avoidance of preferential transfers" (quoting

§ 547 note
196.

ii

U.S.C.

(Historical and Revision Notes: Legislative Statements)).
See supra Part II.

See infra Section V.B.
197.
198.
See Kevin J. Coco, Note, Empty Manipulation: Bankruptcy Procedure Rule 2019
and
Ownership Disclosurein Chapter ii Cases, 2008 COLUM. BUS. L. REv. 6 1 o, 613 (proposing
disclosure
of hedges); Hu & Black, Equity and Debt Decoupling and
Empty Voting II, supra note 30, at 731-33;
Hu & Black, Debt, Equity and Hybrid Decoupling, supra
note 3o, at 684-85.
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governance incentives of originators, sponsors, and servicers of asset-backed
securities. 99

Under current Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure Rule 3001,
creditors must disclose (under penalty of perjury) the amount they are owed
2
and assert that they are the person entitled to receive payment. oo Creditors,
however, do not need to disclose how much they paid to acquire the claim,
whether they have assigned all or part of their right to receive payment to
somebody else, or whether they have insured or otherwise hedged part of the
risk.
Members of both official and unofficial or ad hoc committees2o are
subject to certain enhanced disclosure requirements under Federal Rule of
Bankruptcy Procedure Rule 2019 as controversially amended in 2011.202
These entities must disclose "the nature and amount of each disclosable
economic interest held in relation to the debtor as of the date the .. . group
or committee was formed," including the acquisition date by quarter and year
20
for any interest acquired in the previous year. 3 "Disclosable economic

interest" is defined broadly as "any claim, interest, pledge, lien, option,
participation, derivative instrument, or any other right or derivative right
granting the holder an economic interest that is affected by the value,
acquisition, or disposition of a claim or interest."204 The Rule 2019 disclosure

20
requirement is on-going, 5 and is backed up by a threat of sanctions,
including refusing to hear the motions of the non-compliant 6entities, and
invalidating any votes made by the non-compliant entities.o To ensure
claim
compliance, the disclosure requirement applies not only to the actual
207
attorneys.
to
is,
that
them,
represents
that
holders, but to any party
Requiring disclosure is a partial solution to the conflicted creditor
problem because it eliminates false signaling. Disclosure does not, however,

II disclosure
See supra notes accompanying Section II.B. The SEC Registration AB
and public SEC
litigation
action
class
private
of
threat
the
both
by
up
backed
are
requirements
enforcement. Bankruptcy lacks an analogous public enforcement mechanism.
SeeFED.R.BANKR.P. 3ooi.
200.
or action
An "ad hoc" committee is merely two or more creditors that pursue any motion
201.
What Are
jointly in the bankruptcy. See Richard J. Corbi et al., New Rule 2019: Distressed Investors,
199.

You Hlolding?, AM. BANKR. INST.J.,June 201 1, at 14, 14.
"vigorous
FED. R. BANKR. P. 2019; see also Corbi et al., supra note 201, at 14 (noting the
202.
2019).
Rule
of
debate" over the amendment

205.

FED. R. BANKR. P. 2019(c)
Id. R. 2oi9(a)(i).
Id. R. 201 9 (d).

206.

Id. R. 2019(e) (2).

203.
204.

(2)

(B)-(C).

who
See id. R. 20 19(a) Committee's Note to 201 1 Amendment (noting that "an attorney
the case, but who
is retained and consulted by a creditor or equity security holder to monitor
activities on behalf of
does not advocate any position before the court or engage in solicitation
of this rule").
purposes
for
that client, does not represent the creditor or equity security holder
to the rule's
subject
is
court
the
before
appear
does
who
attorney
an
that
is
The implication
disclosure requirements if representing a group.
207.
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prevent a creditor with a conflict from obstructing a workout or from voting
its claim to block a plan, nor does it eliminate the tension between fiduciary
duty and self-interest that arises when the creditor is serving on a committee.
Moreover, as Rule 2019 disclosure requirements currently exist, they do
not apply to most creditors. Rule 2019 applies only
to "[giroups,
[c]ommittees, and [e]ntities" that represent multiple creditors.2o 8 Thus, there
is no disclosure requirement for individual creditors, as long as they do not
act in concert. As a result, courts lack the information necessary to police the
actions of individual creditors.
For example, in Lyondell Chemical's bankruptcy, the court was powerless
in the absence of mandated disclosure, despite the bankruptcy judge noting
that a trade publication had reported that certain noteholders had
undertaken actions to precipitate the bankruptcy to collect on their credit
default swaps.2 0 9 Judge Gerber lamented:
I'm not in a position to make a factual finding as to the truth of this
report; newspaper articles are hearsay, and the parties' (and the
Court's) inability to know all of the facts as to this is one of the many
manifestations of the opacity of the use of derivatives in bankruptcy
cases. 10
2

Finally, even if the Rule 2og disclosure requirements were universal, the
remedial provisions backing up the requirements are discretionary.2
B.

LIMITING THE FRANCHISE

A second mechanism for addressing the decoupling of governance rights
and economic interest is to limit those governance rights directly.2"2 Again,
there are existing mechanisms under current law: separate classification and
designation. Both of these remedies capitalize on the fact that, under Chapter
i i's plan confirmation process, governance rights are exercised as a member
of a class, and classes accept or reject a plan based on specific supermajority
rules.21s Under Section 1122 of the Bankruptcy Code, creditors may only be
classified together for voting purposes if their claims are "substantially

208.

Id.R.2oig(b)(L).

Lyondell Chem. Co. v. CenterPoint Energy Gas Servs. Inc. (In re Lyondell Chem. Co.),
402 B.R. 571, 585 n.26 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009).
210.
Id.
209.

211.
FED. R. BANKR. P. 2019(e) (authorizing, but not requiring various remedies for
violations of Rule 2019).
21 2.
See Patrick D. Fleming, Credit Derivatives Can Create a FinancialIncentive for Creditors
to
Destroy a Chapter ii Debtor. Section Il 26(e) and Section 105(a) Provide a Solution, I
7 AM. BANKR. INST.
L. REv. 189, 189 (2009); Hu & Black, Equity and Debt Decoupling and Empty
Voting II, supra note
3o, at 735 ("[V]oting rights in bankruptcy may need to be based on net economic ownership
instead of gross ownership of debt. . . .").
213.

11

U.S.C.§ 1126(c)-(d)

(2012).
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similar."214 Under Section 1126, a class of claims only accepts a plan if its
members vote by "more than one-half in number" and "at least two-thirds in
2
amount" to accept. '5 Finally, also under Section 1126, a vote may be
6
"designate [d]" or disregarded if it is cast in bad faith.21 Under these
principles, a hedged claim might need to be classified separately from
unhedged claims, or a creditor who is economically short might have its vote
designated as cast in bad faith.
These tools have a lot to commend them. They largely eliminate the
ability of a creditor to use voting rights to harm the estate for its own benefit.
Disenfranchisement of conflicted creditors is also consistent with bankruptcy
policy as reflected in other Code provisions. Section 702 of the Bankruptcy
Code disenfranchises parties with "interest[s] materially adverse"2 7to other
creditors' as well as insiders from voting in the election of a trustee. 1 Section
1129(a) (io) disenfranchises insiders (who are presumed to have conflicting
interests) from voting on "cramdown" plans, which may be approved with the
8

consent of only a single impaired class of creditors."'
The principal weaknesses of both classification and designation lie in the
difficulty of administering them. Separate classification solves the signaling
of all its
problem caused by empty creditors without depriving the creditor
an
eliminating
by
confirmation
block
to
rights. While it may not be able
block
to
ability
the
with
creditor
the
impaired accepting class, it does leave
consensual confirmation and force a cramdown. Indeed, separate
classification may actually increase a conflicted creditor's ability to block a
consensual plan because its claims will constitute a larger percentage, or even
all, of the separate class.

Id.§§122(a).
of amount.
Id. § 1 126(c). A class of equity interests accepts a plan by a vote of two-thirds
215.
Id. § 1 126(d).
214.

216.

Id.§1126(e).

Id. § 702(a)(2)-(3).
plans, but for
Id. § 1129(a)(10). Section i129(a)(io) applies to all Chapter ii
218.
under
required
vote
the
by
cases
all
almost
in
"consensual" plans under §I 129(a) it is subsumed
1129(a)(8).
§
id.
See
classes.
impaired
all
of
acceptance
the
g129(a)(8), which requires
§
impaired class under
Cramdown plans under § i 1 29 (b) still require the acceptance of a single
accepting under
classes
impaired
all
of
requirement
the
with
dispense
§ 129(a) (so), but
217.

§

112 9 (a)(8).Id.§ 1I2 9 (b)(1).
Act is a
These tools are consistent with the Trust Indenture Act. The Trust Indenture
7bbbb
federal securities statute governing SEC-registered debt securities. See 15 U.S.C. § 7 7 aaa- 7
securities
debt
such
of
restructuring
the
on
restrictions
imposes
(201 2). The Trust Indenture Act
proceed with under
with the purpose of forcing most restructuring into bankruptcy where it can
safeguards. Id.
substantive
and
procedural
various
to
subject
court
the watchful eye of the
are waivable only by individual
restrictions
Act's
Indenture
Trust
the
of
some
§ 77ppp. While
id. § 77ppp(b)
security holders, others are waivable by various majority votes. Compare

(proscribing rights waivable only by individual security holders), with id. § 77ppp (a) (proscribing

rights waivable by vote of majority of security holders).
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Designation also solves the false signaling problem by identifying the
creditor's conflict, but is quite harsh, in that it deprives the creditor of any
voting rights whatsoever.2'9 Both classification and designation are binary
remedies with uncertain triggers. Both can therefore be over- and underinclusive. As we will discuss below, another possibility might be partial
designation-to mark a creditors' voting right down to its real economic
interest in the debtor. In other words, a creditor that has hedged one-third of
its risk might be allowed to vote only one-third of its claim.
A common attribute of all disenfranchisement mechanisms is that none
of them work without a robust disclosure regime. Unless a creditor has
disclosed its position, or another creditor has uncovered that position and
disclosed it to the court, none of these remedies can be imposed. As a result,
in order to work, it may be necessary to impose a general requirement that
creditors with significant positions provide continuous disclosure of changes
in their economic interest in the debtor. This is particularly true of the vote
dilution mechanism we advocate below. However, the remedy we propose is
also more nuanced and need not have a specific trigger, but can be applied
continuously.22o
C.

TRADING BARs

A straightforward solution to most of these problems would be to simply
bar trading in claims once a debtor has filed for bankruptcy. Trading bars
already routinely exist for members of official committees, which are privy to
extensive non-public information about the debtor.221 In a number of cases,
courts have also issued orders restricting and monitoring trading in order to
preserve the estate's tax losses.222
Broad trading bars would have considerable secondary market effects
both on the market in bankruptcy claims and on pre-petition distressed debt
markets. The effect is likely to be ambiguous, however. On the one hand,
would-be buyers and sellers would fear being trapped in an illiquid position
in the event of bankruptcy, which would drive down the price of the debt,
thereby ironically opening the door for Schadenfreude investors to purchase at
a pittance. Alternatively, this risk might be priced into the debt ex ante and

2 i 9.
The leading bankruptcy treatise posits that designation under § 11 26(e) cannot be partial,
but must be done in 1oto, but provides no caselaw support for the interpretation of the Code.

-

7 COLLIER ON BANKRUFECYj 1 126.06[3] (Richard Levin & HenryJ. Sommer eds., i6th ed. 2018).
22o.
We note that our proposed solution-like the existing tools-would apply only
in
bankruptcy. This means that none of them will limit the ability of a "short"
to engage in
obstruction prior to bankruptcy. Also, by diluting or limiting the governance
rights upon
bankruptcy, some claims may be more valuable outside of bankruptcy than in
bankruptcy, and
vice versa, though subject to the "shadow of bankruptcy."
221.
See Levitin, supra note 29, at 75.
222.
Paul D. Leake & Mark G. Douglas, TradingRestrictionsin Bankruptcy: Did the Seventh Circuit
Up the Antefor Stock Trading Injunctions?1i PRATT'SJ.
BANKR. L. 280, 285 (2005)
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lead to more accurate pricing of debt and, perhaps greater cooperation by
creditors on the eve of bankruptcy.
D.

LIMITATION OFDISTRIBUTION

Finally, where a creditor has engaged in some form of bad behavior,
there are existing mechanisms for limiting their distribution through
equitable subordination or disallowance of a claim.223 These remedies exist
under current

law224

and are not based on conflicts of interest per se, but

instead on the behavior that might result from such conflicts. As such, alone
for
among the mechanisms discussed here, they can be used as a mechanism
problem,
The
estate.
the
punishing prepetition behavior that harmed
however, is that these remedies generally have a high trigger, requiring fairly
egregious facts.
E.

PROBLEMS WTII TIIE CURRENT REMEDIES

While the existing remedies are all, to one degree or another, aimed at
the right problems, they are not well adapted to the current trading
environment and current modes of financing. Either they: (1) are blunt and
overly broad instruments with undesirable collateral effects; (2) impose too
high a trigger, so cannot address the pervasiveness of the problem; or (3) are
unworkable because the current regime does not provide sufficient
transparency.
In our view, the bluntness problem lies in the linkage between
distribution and governance. The existing remedies are not well tailored to
the governance problem that we have raised. For example, disallowance limits
the claimant's distribution rights and governance rights, when the problem
lies in governance alone. The same is true of this linkage when one reduces
the allowed amount of a claim to the price for which it was purchased. This
solves the governance problem, but undercuts the liquidity of claims.225
Subordination, perversely, is more likely to affect distribution (by putting the
claimant out of the money) than governance. The separately classified
subordinated claim still votes, but it most likely will be separately classified,
U.S.C. § 510(c) (referring to equitable subordination); see also Pepper v. Litton, 3o8
U.S. 295, 302 (1939) (discussing equitable subordination and disallowance).
The status of equitable disallowance under current law is somewhat unclear; some
224.
courts have authorized it. See Adelphia Recovery Tr. v. Bank of Am., N.A., 39o B.R. 64, 76
at *3
(S.D.N.Y. 2008), adhered to on reconsideration, No. 05 CIV. 9 050(LMM), 2008 WL 1959542,
vacated
1),
201
Del.
D.
(Bankr.
256
200,
B.R.
461
Inc.,
(S.D.N.Y. May 5, 2oo8); In re Wash. Mut.,
2012). But
in part, No. 08-12229 MFW, 2012 WL 1563880, at *16--19 (Bankr. D. Del. Feb. 24,
equitable
to
contrast
in
authorization
statutory
equitable disallowance lacks express
Must Be
subordination. See Alan M. Ahart, Wy the Equitable Disallowance of Claims in Bankruptcy
223.

I

Disallowed, 2o AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 445, 460 (2012).
trade based on
As we will discuss later, our goal is to develop an approach where claims
225.
The benefits of
the economic value of the asset itself, rather than based on a control premium.
control are owned by all of the creditors.
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which ironically increases its voting power because voting is done by classes,
enabling the equitably subordinated creditor to force a cramdown
determination by voting against the plan. Finally, complete designation
deprives the stakeholder of all governance rights when they may still have a
meaningful economic interest that deserves to be represented. Each of these
remedies is inadequately tailored in that they tend to be "all or, nothing."
Moreover, they link and delink governance and distribution in ways that do
not necessarily deal with the evil to be addressed.
The second problem with the existing remedies is that they are difficult
to trigger. All of the existing remedies are viewed as extraordinary
punishments for damaging creditor behavior, rather than routine
adjustments to implement "one dollar, one vote." For example, equitable
subordination requires both inequitable conduct and unfair advantage to the
subordinated creditor or injury to other creditors." 6 Statutory disallowance
generally requires the claim to be invalid under applicable non-bankruptcy
law.227 It is unsettled whether equitable disallowance remains a viable doctrine
under the current Bankruptcy Code, '8 but if so, it would require seriously
inequitable

conduct.

Designation requires

bad faith."9

In our view,

misbehavior is beside the point because the signaling problem resulting from
creditors holding exogenous interests exists irrespective of bad behavior.
A final problem with the existing approach is that there are insufficient
mechanisms to ensure transparency. Existing Rule 2oig imposes some
disclosure obligations on members of official committees and ad hoc
committees,
but those obligations are limited, and can readily be avoided
by eschewing committee membership. A generally applicable disclosure
requirement would eliminate much of the false signaling, but it is also
necessary to implement the more tailored approach that we will describe
23o

below.23

226.

Benjamin v. Diamond (In

227.

1 1 U.S.C.

§ 502 (b) (i).

re Mobile Steel Co.), 563 F.2d 692, 700 ( th Cir. 1977).
5

Compare Harbinger Capital Partners LLC v. Ergen (In re LightSquared Inc.), 504 B.R.
2013) (holding that there is no equitable disallowance under the
Bankruptcy Code), with Adelphia Recovery Tr., 39o B.R. at 74, 8o (affirming bankruptcy court's
denial of motion to dismiss claim for equitable disallowance), and In re Wash. Mut., Inc., 46 1 B.R.
at 258, 267 (denying motion to dismiss and concluding that bankruptcy court has the authority
to disallow claim on equitable grounds), vacated in part upon settlement of parties, No.
o8-i 2229
(MFW), 2012 WL 1563880, at *29 (Bankr. D. Del. Feb. 24, 201 2).
229.
11 U.S.C. § 1126(e).
230.
SeeFED.R.BANKR.P. 2019(b).
231.
The situation we address relates to governance in bankruptcy, not post-bankruptcy
228.

321, 339 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.

governance. Bankruptcy Code § 11 29(a) (5) addresses post-bankruptcy governance by requiring
disclosure of who will be running the company after the plan is confirmed, while § 1123(a)
(6)
and 1123(a) (7) impose restrictions on the governance structure of reorganized businesses.
See
I I U.S.C. §§ I 23(a) (6)-(7), 1129(a) (5).
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The assumption for all of these remedies is that conflicts only matter if it
can be proven that they were acted upon. Our concern is that these conflicts
to suboptimal
are pervasive, and misallocation of governance rights will lead
for
opportunities
creates
misallocation
such
Certainly,
decision-making.
often
more
far
occur
will
that
misbehavior
and
advantage taking, gaming,
than it can be proven. Our goal, therefore, is to address the root cause, rather
than the symptom.
V.

MARK-TO-MARKET GOVERNANCE

The challenge of addressing the empty-creditor and control premium
of Schadenfreude
problems identified above is that they are not just a problem
bankruptcy or
a
in
positions
short
net
investors deliberately assembling
to alter the
leverage
and
rights
Trojan-Horse creditors trying to use control
creditor
innocent
of
variety
bankruptcy priority scheme. There are a wide
a claim.
of
attributes
behaviors that have the effect of modifying the economic
have
debt
Hedging, assigning, or contracting about debt requires that the
claim
consistent economic attributes. The dollar amount of an unsecured
fixes the proportion of the class distribution that the creditor will receive. Any
effective remedy to the empty creditor problem must leave the economic
attributes of the claim intact. Otherwise bankruptcy would destroy the
liquidity of those claims both in bankruptcy and before. To be clear, our
starting point is to leave distributional rights undisturbed.
The challenge, however, suggests the solution. The attributes that must
be preserved undiminished relate to the "economic" attributes of the claims,
not to their "governance" attributes, or at least not to the governance
attributes that grant power in excess of (or in conflict with) economic interest
or that alter the relative distribution of governance rights after insolvency.
The interaction between these two concerns is a bit complex, so we will
illustrate both, and then discuss a common approach to solving them.

A.

DIsTRIBuTION v. GOVERNANCE-AN ILLUSTRA77ON

A key set of distinctions throughout this article has been between
distribution and
economic exit and purchasing control-between
are not fully
that
ways
complicated
governance. The two interact in
entitlements
Distributional
Code.
Bankruptcy
incorporated into the existing
that they
clear
not
is
it
but
law,
and voting rights travel together under current
with
associated
rights
should. It is easy to demonstrate why the distributional
a
that
Imagine
a claim should not be affected by assignment or hedging.
likely
creditor holds a $10 million unsecured claim. Assume that the
distribution in the debtor's bankruptcy is predicted to be $1 million, payable
in two years. The claimant may wish to convert that asset to cash immediately
and might be able to sell it for the present value of $i million two years from
now (perhaps $850,ooo in today's dollars). If the allowed amount of the claim
is discounted to the consideration paid of $850,000, then the distribution on
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account of the purchased claim would only be $85,000 (plus any resulting
increase in the pro-rated dividend, which we will ignore for simplicity's sake),
instead of $1 million. No purchaser would pay $850,000 for a distribution
worth $85,ooo, so the claim would be rendered unsellable. Indeed, the entire
secondary market in bankruptcy claims would collapse if claims were only
allowed at their purchase price. Numerous cases have reaffirmed the principle
that a purchased claim participates, for distributional purposes, at the allowed
face amount of the claim.232
This does not mean, however, that it is not possible (or even desirable)
to make similar adjustments to a claimant's governancerights. A discounting of
governance rights will not render claims unsellable, unlike a discounting of
distribution rights. To the extent the claim was purchased in order to obtain
governance rights (or even the option of governance rights), discounting of
those governance rights will render the claim less attractive to purchasers, but
it will still retain its fundamental economic value. To the extent that
governance power has economic value, that value will be retained for the
benefit of the class. In other words, discounting of governance rights will
reduce a claim's value, but the value of the claim lost will be the governance
premium-the price of the power to distort the distribution to other
creditors, not the entitlement based on the underlying economic rights.
Discounting governance rights will not reduce the overall distribution to
creditors, and to the extent that it preserves the appropriate balance of
governing power within the estate, it may actually produce an increase. This
is because the discounting of governance rights can be used to maintain the
alignment of economic interest among members of a creditor class and to
preserve equality of distribution. To understand how, envision a bankruptcy
case with four unsecured creditors, each with a $1o million claim. The current
best guess at this stage in the bankruptcy is that unsecured claims will
ultimately receive a io% distribution. 33 Here's how things stand:

232.
See, e.g., In re Nortel Networks, Inc., 532 BR. 494, 56o (Bankr. D. Del. 2015)
("[T]he
price paid by a secondary purchaser has no impact on its substantive rights... . Were the Court
to accede to the suggestion that secondary purchase prices are relevant, the effect on the
distressed market would be devastating."). The one exception to this is that claims with original
issue discount are allowed only at the amount paid, with the original issue discount treated as
interest included in the allowed claim only to the extent that it is deemed to have matured prepetition according to whatever amortization schedule is used. Tex. Commerce Bank, NA v. Licht
(In re Pengo Indus., Inc.), 962 F.2d 543, 546-47 ( 5 th Cir. 1992); LTV Corp. v. Valley Fidelity
Bank & Tr. Co. (In reChateaugay Corp.), 961 F.2d 378, 383 (2d Cir. 1992); Official Comm. of
Unsecured Creditors v. UMB Bank, N.A. (In re Residential Capital, LLC),
501 B.R. 549, 557,
585-86 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2013); In reSolutia Inc., 379 B.R. 473, 486 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007).
233. For simplicity's sake, we ignore the question of when the distribution will take place, as
it will affect the discounting of the distribution to present value. While timing often matters
substantially to creditors, it is not essential for demonstrating our point.
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*

The first creditor loaned the debtor $10 million and,
uncontroversially, stands to receive a pro rata distribution of
$1 million based on a claim of that amount.

*

The second creditor purchased a $io million claim from
the original lender for $i million and also stands to receive
a pro rata $i million payout.

*

The third creditor purchased a $io million claim from the
original lender for $1 million, but then entered into a swap
transaction with a third party under which it was guaranteed
a payment of $1 million because the swap counterparty
would pay the creditor the difference between the amount
the creditor received as a distribution, while the creditor
would pay any amount received over $i million to the swap
counterparty.

*

Finally, a fourth creditor purchased a $io million claim
from the original lender for $1 million, but also entered
into three swap contracts under the same terms as the
previous creditor such that it would be paid three times any
decline in value, and would pay three times any increase in
value of the purchased claim.

Each of these creditors (even the first two) has a different economic interest
in the debtor's future.
The first creditor has $io million of value at risk and will strive to
maximize the return for its class in order to maximize its own return. Thus,
the first creditor's interests are aligned with those of similarly situated
unsecured creditors, and with the debtor to the extent that it is in a residual
class of claims.
Whereas the first creditor sees itself as potentially losing $io million, the
second creditor sees only $i million of potential downside risk. It too will seek
to maximize the return for its class in order to maximize its own return, but it
is likely to view various exit strategies in an entirely different light. On one
level, this represents the "sunk cost" fallacy, namely that prospective
investment decisions will be made based on past losses, rather than on
2
maximizing future returns. 34 Today, both creditors have the same economic
interest-a claim with a market value of $i million-but they are likely to
behave differently because of how their position is framed. Also, to the extent
that the claim represents governance rights, these governance rights were
purchased at a bargain price.

234.

61

6o,
See Thomas Kelly, Sunk Costs, Rationality, and Acting for the Sake of the Past, 38 Nois

(2004).
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The third creditor, by contrast is an indifferent creditor, with no stake in
the outcome of the case at all. It neither benefits from the debtor's gains nor
is it harmed by the debtor's losses. It nonetheless has governance rights.
The fourth creditor is a Schadenfreude investor. The worse the debtor
does, the greater the payments the fourth creditor will receive on its multiple
swaps. The better the debtor does, the more it has to pay. Also note that
the
economic interests of the third and fourth creditors are not affected
by
whether they purchased the claim or were the original creditor.
The
difference in economic interest is created by the steps that they took to hedge.
1.

Proportional Dilution for Hedgers and Shorts

For the indifferent investor and the Schadenfreude investor, the link
between the governance rights and economic interest that forms the basis
for
creditor control rights is broken, or worse yet, inverted. The rationale
for
giving these creditors voting rights disappears. In these cases, while there
is
no reason to disturb the economic bet that the derivative transactions create
(i.e., to subordinate the claim or disallow it), there is every reason to adjust
the voting rights to reflect the economic reality of each creditor.
Accordingly, we propose that a creditor who has hedged some or all of
its exposure should have its voting rights reduced proportionally so that its
governance rights reflect its economic interest. Also, for reasons discussed
below,235 we believe that the bankruptcy policy of equitable treatment
mandates that any control rights belong to the class, not to any individual class
member. Therefore, claims purchased at a discount should have their
governance rights allocated to reflect their basis, which also reserves the value
of the any control premia to the class as a whole. We refer to this governance
allocation as "mark-to-interest," which is the first component of a system we
term "mark-to-market governance."
The conceptual underpinning of "marking-to-interest" is not particularly
radical. Many governance schemes protect the integrity of the democratic
process by policing an identity of interest. Political party primaries often,
but
not always, require membership in the relevant party.23 6 Other voting

235.

See infra Section V.A.2.

/

236.
See State Primary Election 7pes, NAT'L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (June 26, 2018),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/primary-types.aspx.
The experience in
open primaries is instructive, in that it generally reflects a party choice to seek
the most broadly
acceptable (centrist) candidate. Sometimes it works, as with the recent selection,
in Mississippi of
Senator Thad Cochran as the Republican senatorial candidate. When faced
with a more
conservative Tea Party challenger in the primary, Cochran reached across party
lines to normally
Democratic African American voters. See, e.g., Ashley Parker & Jonathan Martin,
G.O.P. Senator
Courts Blacks in MississippiPrimary Race, N.Y. TIMES (June 20, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/
2014/o6/21/us/politics/cochran-asking-blacks-to-rescue-him-in-republican-primary.html.
The
result was that the relatively more centrist candidate, Cochran, was selected. Mississippi
Election
Results, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 17, 2014, 12:28 PM), https://www.nytimes.com/elections/2o
4
mississippi-elections. Even this was not without controversy, but open primaries
also leave open a
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mechanisms that limit franchise based on conflicts of interest include judicial
recusal rules,237 and most directly applicable, recusal rules for interested
directors in corporate transactions.23

8

Even shareholders are subject to

antifraud rules that limit insider trading (reallocating firm value to insiders)
and rules with regard to oppression of minority shareholder issues.23o Thus,

the issue should not be whether we are raising a valid governance concern,
but about whether there is a means of regulation wherein the benefits exceed
the costs.
Basis-Allocated Governance Rights: Preserving Equality of Distribution
Our second concern is more complicated, but it starts from the fact,
noted above, that once a debtor becomes insolvent, the changing price of
debt reflects a changing price of governance. In other words, the "one-dollar,
one-vote" principle breaks down. As the price of distressed debt changes, so
does the price of a blocking position or an accepting position. One day a
blocking position could cost $1oo,ooo. The next day it could cost $2oo,ooo.
The problem here is notjust that the value of the blocking position fluctuates,
but so too does its distribution.
of a
The problem is most easily understood in reference to the stock
a
having
of
valuing
solvent company. A "control premium" attaches to the
for
needed
share
controlling stake in the company-the value of the marginal
control is more than the value of a regular share because it brings with it the
control rights. Yet that marginal share cannot be acquired without also
owning all of the shares short of the final share needed for control. The point
here is that the value of the control premium is distributed unevenly among
shareholders. A controlling block is worth more on a per share basis than a
minority block of shares. And when a company is in play, the first shareholders
to tender to a buyer seeking control can realize on the control premium.
Once the buyer has achieved control, the later tendering shareholders will
not receive the control premium for their shares.
The fact that the control premium is unevenly distributed among
creditors creates a ratable distribution problem that does not exist in equity
markets. Bankruptcy law seeks to lock in the relative positions of creditors as
2.

candidate in the other
possibility for abuse, with cross-over voters supporting the least palatable
general election. Id.;
party's primary so as to improve their party's candidate's chances in the
15, 2017), https://
(June
HUFFPOsT
Idea,
Wrong
A
Andy Schmookler, Open Primaries:

10471 3 9 6.html.
www. huffingtonpost.com/andy-schmookler/open-primaries-a-wrong-idb
556 (1994).
541-43,
540,
U.S.
10
States,
United
5
28 U.S.C. 455 (2012); Litekyv.
237.
BOARDS OF
SUBSIDIARY
U.S.
AND
NASDAQ
FOR
CONDUCT
OF
CODE
See, e.g., NASDAQ,
238.
2c-8da8-eof87c6d66fi
DIRECTORS 1-2 (2016), http://ir.nasdaq.com/static-files/ed2focdi-dgcf- 4 3

(effective November 1, 2018).
of Minority
17 C.F.R. § 2 4 0.]ob- 5 (2018). See generally F. Hodge O'Neal, Oppression
239.

(describing common causes
Shareholders:ProtectingMinority Rights, 35 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 121 (1987)

ways to combat
of shareholder disputes, efforts to suppress minority shareholders' interests, and
shareholder suppression).
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of the petition date.24o Uneven and shifting distribution of the control
premium among members of a class, postpetition, changes the allocation of
the value of governance rights over time. To the extent that these rights have
value, exiting creditors may realize on that value, while remaining creditors
will not.
The best way to think about this is to recognize that the control rights of
a class belong to the whole class equally and are allocated to the class as a
whole, rather than to any individual creditor. Again, having raised the
problem, the question is how to fix it, and whether the fix is worth the cost.
B.

THE PROPOSEDSorLTION

Conceptually, our proposed solution is simple. Where a creditor has
"hedged" its interest, the voting rights should reflect its actual economic
interest as it applies to the particular creditor class. And, where a creditor has
sold its claim, the governance rights should be discounted to reflect the
creditor's basis.
As discussed above, because claims can be purchased at a discount and
because there are multiple blocking positions in bankruptcy, holdout power
is greater in bankruptcy than outside.24, A key goal of bankruptcy law is to

limit such holdout power.242 Outside of bankruptcy, individual creditors have
the ability to veto any change to their debt obligations.243 In bankruptcy, such
obligations can be modified by a vote of other creditors.244
While we have referred to the adjustment of governance rights through
the shorthand of "mark-to-market," that is not exactly what we are proposing.
A literal marking of economic interest to market would allow a creditor to
vote based on the market value of its claim (excluding the market value
attributable to the voting rights). What we would propose, instead, is a
solution that addresses hedgers and purchasers separately.
For hedgers, we propose marking their claims to their economic interest
("mark-to-interest"). This would entail a proportional dilution of voting rights
based on the extent to which the creditor faces the full risk of its position. For
example, if a creditor has hedged half its risk, its voting rights should be
reduced by 50%.

For claims purchasers, we propose to mark their claim to their purchase
price ("mark-to-basis"). This would entail allocating governance rights based
on the purchase price, instead of the face amount of the debt (which would
still be used for distributional purposes). If a creditor purchased a $2,ooo

240.
One of us has developed the issue of equitable distribution of firm value extensively in
a separate manuscript. SeeJacoby &Janger, TracingEquity, supra note 4, at 696-7o6.
241.
See supra Part II.
242.
SeeLEVITIN, supra note 39, at791, 936.

243.
244.

Bratton & Levitin, supra note 46, at 1604.
11 U.S.C. §§ 1123, 1126, 1129 (2012).
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claim for $400, it should have voting rights associated with the $400 purchase

price, instead of the $2,ooo debt. The effect of using basis, rather than face
amount is to allow for economic exit, while preserving the value of control for
the class as a whole. Each time a creditor exits, its governance rights would be
reallocated to the entire class.
Marking the claims governance rights to basis largely solves both the
problem of underpaying for a control premium and the problem that the
control premium is not distributed equally across the class. The solution is to
discount the voting rights, but not the distributional rights related to a claim.
A numerical example illustrates the point. If, on the petition date, there
were $1oo in claims in a class, a blocking position would require $33 of claims
and a control position would require $67 of claims. If, for example, one
month into the case, claims were selling for 500 on the dollar, then $33 in
claims could be purchased for $16.50. If the voting rights were marked to
basis, however, $33 in debt purchased for $16.50 would convey only $16.50
in voting rights, but would still represent $3g in distributional rights.
Accordingly, to amass a blocking position would require a purchase of $66 in
face amount at a 50% discount. Whereas distribution rights are allocated by
face amount, voting rights are allocated by basis.
The same marking-to-basis mechanism also largely (though not entirely)
alleviates the problem of unequal distribution. If a claim is purchased at a
rights
50% discount, then the voting rights would be split. Half of the voting
the
while
dollar,
the
would go to the purchaser who purchased for 5 0t on
claimants
all
to
remaining half would effectively be reallocated, pro rata,
according to their original economic interest.
Thus, with a class of $ioo in claims, a claimant who purchased $66 in
claims for $33 would end up with $66 of distribution rights-two-thirds of the
distribution rights in the class-but it would receive only one-half of voting
rights in the class ($33 of $66), reflecting the claimant's share of the total
basis of the class's claimants.245 Neither would have a control position, but
all resulting in the
The dollar amount of voting rights can be conceived in three ways,
245.
same percentage allocation of voting rights. First, the claimant can be conceived as having $33
class ($33 for the
out of a total of $66 in voting rights, because $66 is the total basis for the
power
claimant plus $33 for the rest of the class). The result is one half ($33 of $66) of the voting
goes to the claim purchaser.
third of
Second, we can think of there being a reallocation of the voting premium of one
basis
and
($66)
amount
face
claimant's
the
between
the total votes (representing the difference
$44 and the
of
total
a
for
premium
33%
a
+
votes
in
$33
get
($33)), so that the claimant would
of $44 in votes. The
other class members would get $33 in votes plus a 33% premium for a total
result again is one half of the voting power ($44 of $88) goes to the claim purchaser.
Third, the claimant can be conceived as having $50 out of a total of $soo in voting ights.
($66) and basis
This approach takes the $33 difference between the claimant's face amount
claim purchaser) on the basis of
the
(including
claimants
all
to
rata
pro
it
($33) and reallocates
($17) for a total
their basis. The claim purchaser receives one half of the reallocated voting rights
a total of $50. Yet again, the result
for
($i7)
half
one
receives
class
the
of
rest
the
of $50, while
is one half of the voting power ($50 of $1oo) goes to the claim purchaser.
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both would have blocking positions and would have to deal with each other.
Purchasing control would be even more difficult. It would be necessary for a
purchaser to purchase four-fifths of the face amount of a class to obtain a
control position of two-thirds of the votes.
In thinking about the impact of such an approach, it is important to
consider what it accomplishes, and what it does not. Mark-to-basis principally
limits the ability of a claims trader to purchase control rights at a discount and
mark-to-interest limits the ability of a creditor to use those rights to the
disadvantage of other similarly situated creditors while creating a benefit
outside the creditor class. For example, a creditor with short options, marked
to interest, could not use its voting rights to the advantage of its derivative
position because its voting rights would be proportionally diluted. A creditor
who purchased a position in a class at a discount, would still be able to vote its
claims, but only to the extent of the amount paid. The logic for hedgers lies
in preserving interest alignment. The logic for traders, again, lies in equal
distribution of the monetary value of control.
C.

SOME COMPLICATIONS

One complication for the proportional dilution rule is that hedging
comes in many forms.24 6 The principle of proportional dilution is more
difficult to administer in situations where the value of control to the
conflicting interest is more difficult to value. Three examples have been
mentioned above: (1) secured creditors' deficiency claims or other creditors
who have invested across the capital structure; (2) landlords; and
(3) competitors.47 An undersecured creditor will frequently have a large
deficiency claim.248 The right to vote that claim as a member of the unsecured
creditor class may create significant opportunities for the senior creditor to
capture value that it does not own. Imagine that two secured creditors have
liens on assets of the debtor worth $3 million and claims of $io million. The
debtor has other assets worth $1 million, and unsecured creditors with claims
of $3 million. The secured creditors have the power to control the unsecured
creditor class through their unsecured deficiency claims. They could thereby
vote to support a plan with an artificially low valuation that transferred
ownership of the debtor to the secured parties while giving a very small cash

In any case, the claim purchaser only ends up with one half of the voting rights in the class.
Mathematically there is no difference between disregarding the voting rights reflected by the
difference between face and basis and redistributing them pro rata on the basis of basis, because
the pro rata redistribution, by definition, does not affect the ratio of the numerator and
denominator in the voting. For bankruptcy law purposes it makes no difference which calculation
is used.
246.
247.

See supra Section II.A.

See supra Sections II.E. -. 6.
4
See II U.S.C. § 5 o6(b) (providing for bifurcation of undersecured claims into a secured
claim for the value of the collateral and an unsecured claim for the deficiency).

248.
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payout to the unsecured class. Similarly, a landlord may prefer to recover
control of its space to recovering on a breach claim or receiving cure
payments over time. Finally, a competitor might favor liquidation even if it is
not value maximizing on its claim because the demise of a competitor would
have considerable economic value.
Unlike the challenges of modern financial instruments and distressed
debt trading, these conflicts are not novel. Indeed, they are the genesis of the
existing remedies.249 Separate classification of the deficiency claim means that
the other unsecured creditors will still be able to accept as a class if they
choose to. The deficiency class will not accept, and cram-down will be
necessary, but this would be true even if the secured creditor alone were to
vote no. The main difference is that if there is an objecting unsecured class,

20
the absolute priority rule will apply, and equity will have to be wiped out. 5 As

for the landlord or the competitor, designation of votes may be an adequate
remedy, as the conflict of interest should be readily apparent. In each of these
situations, the appropriate dilution may be difficult to calculate, and while the
principle may be operating, existing remedies might be better suited to the
problem.
In short, we would only apply our approach to hedgers and traders. It
seems that proportional and relative dilution are remedies that work
particularly well for hedged and/or traded claims, but for the other types of
conflicts we have discussed, existing remedies may be sufficient.
A second complication arises when governance rights are discounted
based on basis. The result of one claim's governance rights being discounted
is that existing claimants may have their governance rights enhanced.
Blocking positions may emerge where previously they did not exist. On the
one hand, this seems unfair, but when applied in actual cases, it shows how
the two prongs of mark-to-market governance work together by permitting
economic exit and preventing the sale of a control premium. To the extent
that a class has governance rights within a Chapter 11 case, that right belongs
to the class, not one subset of creditors who choose to sell into a developing
control block because the right exists only by virtue of the existence of the
class. The effect of calculating governance rights based on basis is that the
control premium is constantly reallocated among the existing creditors. Since
the control premium cannot be purchased, each time there is a sale of a claim,
any discounted control rights are reallocated to the other members of the
class to be shared equally. This solves the equity problem. It also reinforces
the importance of proportional dilution for hedgers. A purchaser who is
purchasing an economic interest will have to rely on the other creditors to

249.

See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 411 (1977)

(noting that the good faith voting

claims in
requirement of is U.S.C. § 1 126(e) is to address the situation of when a creditor holds
multiple classes).
11 U.S.C. § I 1 2 9 (b) (2).
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exercise their rights on behalf of the class in a non-conflicted manner. As a
result, robust disclosure and mechanisms to retain interest alignment would
be a prerequisite to any claim's liquidity. While it might seem farfetched to
think that investors would buy economic claims stripped of their voting rights,
a number of recent tech offerings have included shares with no voting
power.2 5' The lack of voting rights has not been an impediment to marketing
the shares.
D.

PURCHASE OFSECURED PoSITIONS

As noted above, the right to credit bid can be used by a secured creditor
to capture value in excess of its secured claim. The Free Lance-Star case
illustrates a means for solving this problem, which we call "mark-to-value." In
that case, the court concluded, however, that the claims purchaser did not
have a lien on all of the corporate assets, and hence on the corporation's
enterprise value.252 Accordingly, the court limited the creditor's right to credit
bid to an amount based solely on the value of the assets on which it had a valid
lien.253 The effect was to limit the likelihood that the debt overhang would
chill the bidding at the sale and to preserve for later resolution the question
of how much of the firm's value was allocable to the secured creditor's claim.
The Free Lance-Star ruling has been quite controversial. 254 However, the
court's action can be viewed as an elegant move to mark the secured creditor's
claim to market. The secured creditor's strategy in Free Lance-Star was an
attempt to lever the value of the liened assets into ownership and control of
the company. In short, the claim purchaser seemed to think that the secured
claim carried with it control rights and hence a control premium. The court's
decision limited the governance rights (specifically, the right to credit bid) to
the liquidation value of the creditor's collateral and preserved disputes about
allocation of value for later.255
We believe that limiting a secured creditor's ability to credit bid to the
amount of its allowed secured claim ("mark-to-value") is an important third
component of a system of "mark-to-market governance." Indeed, asJanger has
explained elsewhere, the principle is already required by Sections 506, 6 (k)
3 3
and 1129(b) (2) (A).25 6 Sales procedures are an important part of governance
251. James Rufus Koren & Paresh Dave, Snap Won't Give Shareholders Voting Rights. For That,
It's Being Shunned by a Major Stock Index, L.A. TIMES (July 28, 2017, 10:40 AM), https://
www.1atimes.com/business/la-fi-snap-russell-indices-20170
7 2 7-story.html. Notably, bankruptcy
law requires any plan of reorganization to include a provision in the charter of the reorganized
debtor prohibiting such nonvoting equity securities. See 11 U.S.C. § i 123(a) (6).
252.
In re Free Lance-Star Publ'g Co. of Fredericksburg, 512 B.R. 798, 807-08 (Bankr. E.D.
Va. 2014).
253.
Id. (discussing valuation methodology).
254.
Tyler P. Brown et al., Secured Lender's Credit-Bid Capped in Free Lance-Star, 33 AM. BANKR.
INsT.J. *1, *3 (2014)255.
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in bankruptcy, and the ability to credit bid beyond the value of one's collateral
confers the power to chill cash bids.257 Just as any control premium belongs

to a class, not an individual creditor, secured creditors should not be able to
use their power over assets to distort the Bankruptcy Code's priority scheme
including the relationship between asset-based and firm-based claims. Just as
with hedgers and discount buyers, the problem of secured creditors
attempting to credit bid on assets of the debtor firm that are not part of their
collateral can be solved by preserving the "relative governance rights"
associated with a claim, while leaving the distributional rights intact.
E.

PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS

In sum, ensuring that creditors are given governance rights in
accordance with their economic interest in the debtor and limiting their
ability to use or accumulate control rights to harm the firm or distort the
Code's distributional priorities is a theme that underlies a variety of existing
remedies under the Bankruptcy Code. Separate classification, designation of
votes, and subordination of claims are all existing tools in the court's
repertoire.
In this Article, however, we have identified three contexts where modern
claims trading demands novel remedies.
First, the existing regime is inadequate and needs to be
*
modified to account for the possibility of positions hedged
with derivatives (mark-to-interest).
*

Second, purchasing a claim at a discount from face amount
may increase the power of holdouts and violates the
bankruptcy policy of equality of treatment (mark-to-basis).

*

And third, where secured creditors are involved, limiting
the right to credit bid to the value of the collateral-already
occurring in some cases-can be accomplished by applying
Section 3 6 3 (k) (mark-to-value).

Each context necessitates a recalibration of control rights to achieve a
mark-to-market governance system that reflects bankruptcy's underlying
principles of value-maximizing governance and equitable distribution. In the
next section we describe how this might be done.
VI.

IMPLEMENTATION

The value of any creditor's position in a bankruptcy case has two
components: the economic rights to a distribution and the governance rights
that help to determine how to maximize the value of the firm's assets.
Claimants may attempt to use their governance rights to enhance their

257.
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distribution at the expense of other claimants or the firm by separating their
economic rights from their governance rights. Claims trading also allows
selling claimants to sell control linked shares at a premium, while allowing
claims purchasers to purchase blocking positions at a discount. The goal of
this Article is to reestablish the connection between the claimant's economic
position and its governance rights through three practical approaches:
(1) proportional dilution of voting rights for all creditors that are hedged;
(2) discounting the governance rights of purchased claims to the claimant's
basis; and (3) by limiting the secured creditor's right to credit bid to the
estimated value of its collateral.
In our view there is statutory authority for a partial implementation of
our approach under current law in the Code, though the infrastructure would
need to be created at the beginning of a case by order, local rule, or
amendment to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. In this section, we
identify the limits of existing law and propose a practical approach to
implementation mark-to-interest and mark-to-basis governance. In our view
there is existing legal authority, under Section 1 126 of the Bankruptcy
Code,
to designate shorts, though not, except perhaps under Section 105, to dilute
partial hedges or claims traders. In our view, there is already authority, under
Sections 36 3 (k) and 5o6 to limit credit bidding to the allowed secured claim,
as illustrated by Free Lance-Star.258
A.

IMPLEMENTING AIARK-TO-INTEREST AND MARK-TO-BASIS

For the partially hedged, or even indifferent creditor, it would be difficult
to characterize a vote as case in bad faith under Section 12 6(e). However,
for a true Schadenfreude investor, where the interest of the investor and the
firm have diverged, then bad faith can be inferred from the conflict of interest
itself. Designation (or equitable subordination) seems an appropriate
response, and one that could be implemented immediately. Our more
aggressive proposals, we think, would require an amendment to the Code.
That said, we do think that both a modest version, as well also our more robust
version, could be implemented by the same procedural mechanism.
A mark-to-market regime, in both its forms, would require a more robust
disclosure system than currently exists. As noted above, Rule 2019 currently
requires ad hoc committee members and official committee members to
disclose more about their economic position than just the face value of their
claim.259 They must also disclose when they purchased their "disclosable
economic interest" in the debtor by quarter if it was purchased in the past
year.2 6 0 Disclosure of the nature and amount of the interest as well as the
general time when it was purchased can serve as a rough proxy for disclosure
258.
259.
260.
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of the price paid for the interest; for example, it is feasible for parties to
discover roughly what a total return swap on the debtor would have cost two
quarters ago.
Mark-to-market governance would necessitate a similar type of disclosure
6
to Rule 2019, but it would have to apply to all claimants. 1 Beyond the Rule
such
2019 disclosure content, for mark-to-market governance to work,
their
for
paid
creditors would also have to disclose the consideration they
claims, something that is likely to be fiercely resisted because it will enable
outside observers to calculate the successfulness of different investors'
strategies.
The timing of these disclosures is important. To the extent that Chapter
1 1 expects smaller creditors to free-ride by watching the behavior of larger
creditors, the only way to avoid false signaling is to require periodic updating
of these disclosures, including whenever there is a material change in their
disclosable interest.
Most importantly, however, we would require a final disclosure at the
time of a distribution under a plan, after governance rights have been
exercised. This would allow the claims agent tabulating ballots to apply the
mark-to-market principles to each claim. Finally, because claims may be
traded even after voting, a creditor with a blocking position might vote against
the plan, and then build a short position based on the knowledge of its vote.
Thus, creditors who have voted on a plan should be required to make a
certification as of the effective date of the plan that there has been no material
change in its economic interest. If there has been a material change, then the
court should have the power to recalculate the governing majorities, and, if
necessary, revoke plan confirmation.2s
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Our concerns about non-voting governance rights do not extend to Chapter
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IMPLEMENTING MARK-TO-VALUE

For secured creditors, as noted above, the architecture we suggest has
already been partially implemented in a number of cases using Section
3 6 3 (k), and may be required by Sections 506 and 112 9 (b) (2) (A).263 Section
36 3 (k) allows the court to limit the power to credit bid at a bankruptcy sale
"for cause."2 6 4 In Free Lance-Star, and a similar case Fisker Automotive Holdings,
secured creditors who purchased their claims had their right to credit bid
limited to the amount they had paid for the purchased debt.2 65 This did
not,
in either case, determine their distributional rights, but it did facilitate
bidding by other parties at the auction by limiting the effect of
the
overhanging credit bid.
In both of these cases, however, the court's decision to limit the right to
credit bid was accompanied by findings that the creditor had engaged in
inequitable behavior.2 6 6 Many commenters have taken the view that those
two
courts were relying on egregious inequitable behavior by the bidding
creditors.2 6 7 It is certainly true that the behavior of the secured creditors in
both cases played a role. However, it was important to the court in FreeLanceStar that the bidding creditor did not have a perfected lien on all of the assets
being sold, and, more importantly, the court was particularly upset by the way
in which the creditor tried to leverage its lien rights into control rights.
Indeed, that was the inequitable behavior identified, and the remedy was to
mark the "control rights" to market.2 68
In our view, the lesson of Free Lance-Star and Fisker is broader than is
commonly understood. Whenever a debtor is conducting an all asset sale, it is
not by any means clear that the incumbent secured lender has a perfected
lien on all of the firm's value.2 6 9 As such, there will often be cause to limit the
right to credit bid to the value of the secured creditor's lien-to mark the bids
to market.
VII.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, modem trading technology increases the liquidity of debt,
and this includes distressed debt. As such, debt now trades in a manner similar
to equity securities. Because bankruptcy gives governance rights
to creditors,
263.
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the empty voting problem that has been observed in modern mergers and
acquisition practice appears to have migrated to the bankruptcy forum.
We believe that matching governance rights to economic interest is the
proper way to align investment incentives such that firm value is most likely to
be maximized by its stakeholders. Just because a rule is likely to be wealth
maximizing does not mean that it will not be controversial. When the
bankruptcy court in Northwest Airlines found in 2007 that the then current
version of Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 2oig required an ad hoc
for
group of creditors to make various disclosures, including the amount paid
debt
distressed
from
any "claims or interests" in the debtor, 270 the reaction
investors was quick and furious.271
There is no denying that disclosure obligations would lead to a loss of
to
liquidity of bankruptcy claims. Some creditors would not want to be subject
a disclosure requirement both because of its administrative burdens and
potential liability and because of the concern about revealing information
about their trading strategies and success. Indeed, we recognize that the
changes we propose may make certain trading strategies less profitable.
But even if our proposal has a chilling effect on the claims trading
market, that should not be dispositive in terms of evaluating its merits. Claims
trading has important benefits, 272 but those benefits are only realized if the
market in which claims are traded are open and transparent and if
not limit
governance rights are properly distributed. Our approach does
"economic exit." It merely reestablishes the link between governance rights
and economic interest. Indeed, fixing this problem in bankruptcy helps limit
in
the problem outside of bankruptcy. If misallocated control rights are lost
to
incentive
less
is
there
so
bankruptcy,
bankruptcy, they lose value outside of
engage in empty creditor behavior overall.
Mark-to-market governance on the basis of "one dollar, one vote"
provides a mechanism for reducing the distortions that empty voting can
cause in bankruptcy while preserving the benefits of the claims trading market
as relates to purely economic rights.
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